

## 5. PARTNERING WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD

To defeat the international jihadist movement, the United States must promote discussion in the Islamic world of values such as democracy, civil liberties, nonviolence, and protection of non-combatants. Traditional propaganda mechanisms and mediums, such as television and radio programs, will only constitute a small part of the solution. In fact, public diplomacy efforts spearheaded by the U.S. government will most likely be looked on with skepticism in the Islamic world. The most effective public diplomacy initiatives will be those led by nongovernmental organizations, governments other than that of the United States, and leaders in the Islamic world.

The U.S. government should take an active role in stimulating such groups, governments, and individuals to assume these tasks. Public diplomacy efforts will be successful only if they are matched by modifications to the U.S. foreign policies that affect issues most important to the Arab world: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S. support for repressive but Western-leaning regimes, and the conflict in Iraq. Although changes in U.S. policy in the Middle East will not alter the jihadists' view of the United States, particular adjustments in policy would have an effect on general public opinion in the Islamic world (the outermost of our concentric circles), which in turn will undermine the jihadists' base of support.

At the present time, it would be difficult to overstate the extent and depth of American unpopularity in the Arab world. In some ways, the United States has become a lightning rod for Arab criticisms and frustrations. For example, a Shibley Telhami poll administered by Zogby in February and March of 2003 found that large majorities in all five Arab countries surveyed held an unfavorable opinion of the United States.<sup>1</sup> In three countries; Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt, 80 percent or more reported holding unfavorable impressions of the United States. A Pew survey, also completed in the run-up to the war in Iraq, similarly reported widespread anti-Americanism in the Arab world as well as in Muslim countries more generally.

In the case of Lebanon and Jordan, where the same questions were asked in the summer of 2002 and again in March of 2003, a further erosion of U.S. popularity was registered over time.<sup>2</sup> Due to the lack of survey research in the Middle East prior to the mid- to late 1990s, it is difficult to put America's favorability ratings in fuller historical context. It is abundantly clear, however, that the United States engenders negative associations in most parts of the Middle East and North Africa, and its standing has fallen precipitously since the onset of the second Palestinian intifada in the fall of 2000.

The purpose of a public diplomacy campaign is to change a target audience's opinion concerning a particular issue or set of issues. Implicit in the premise of public diplomacy campaigns is the idea that given a well-crafted and precisely delivered message, the intended audience cannot help but be influenced over time. Because public opinion can be shaped, a failure to "win hearts and minds" can be attributable to a misreading of the demographics, sloppy implementation, or a poorly calibrated appeal. This logic is frequently applied to the U.S. inability to curb rising antipathy toward America in the Arab world. The consensus is that the United States simply does not understand its audience or, in the words of one commentator, fails to "take Arabs seriously."<sup>3</sup>

The concept of public diplomacy is best understood as a subset of the instruments of strategic influence.<sup>4</sup> Whereas strategic influence encompasses both coercion and persuasion, public diplomacy typically focuses on the latter. An advisory group convened at the behest of the U.S. Congress to study methods for improving the application of public diplomacy defined it as "the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around the world."<sup>5</sup> In short, it is the art of shaping how the United States is perceived abroad through the management of information and the representation of America in the public sphere.

Perhaps the most recognizable component of public diplomacy is foreign broadcasting, as exemplified by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe services. Other high-profile efforts include the U.S. attempt to win over the Vietnamese public with its Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) campaign and its earlier efforts to use media outlets to promote denazification in postwar Germany.<sup>6</sup> Public diplomacy can also operate in the opposite direction, in the sense that rather than communicating through leaflets, radio transistors, or televisions, foreign nationals can be brought to the United States in the hope of promoting American culture

and values through firsthand exposure. Public diplomacy campaigns extend to both receptive and hostile audiences, seeking to reinforce positive perceptions as well as win over adversaries. Replicating the successful use of information campaigns during the Cold War has generated much of the interest in reenergizing public diplomacy today.

Although there is certainly truth to the notion that U.S. outreach in the region has been hindered by an inability to comprehend the nuances of Arab identity, linguistics, history, and iconography, those concerns are less important than the much stronger connection between anti-American attitudes and American foreign policy. Simply put, the effects of U.S. military, political, and economic engagement in the Middle East are too dramatic to be easily recast by rhetorical campaigns. Public diplomacy has a role to play in shaping America's image abroad, but in the immediate context of Arab public opinion, its impact will remain at the margins.

Assertions that improved public diplomacy can take the edge off growing anti-Americanism vastly underestimate the skepticism and sophistication of audiences in the Middle East and North Africa. The narratives of al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are currently defeating the U.S. government's public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East. Those efforts are being defeated not because the United States has ceded the debate or is inept at pitching the story, but because of U.S. interventions that often contradict the self-promoting rhetoric.<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign policy is neither uniformly "for" or "against" Arab interests, but America's record on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as its historical support for Western-leaning regimes in the region despite their unpopular and repressive rule, has reinforced anti-Americanism in the Middle East.<sup>8</sup> In addition to what happens in the future in Iraq, American action on these fronts will determine the popular standing of the United States in the region.

## REACHING OUT TO THE ARAB WORLD

In a little over two years, the United States has embarked on three major public diplomacy initiatives in the Arab world: Radio Sawa, al-Hurra, and al-Iraqiya (see Table 5.1, page 95). Each of these efforts was designed to raise America's favorability ratings. For example, Radio Sawa was a direct response to the failings of Voice of America, which

was plagued with poor signal strength and unimaginative content. In contrast, Radio Sawa promised to appeal to a younger demographic with the use of popular music as the initial hook. Similarly, al-Hurra was conceived to be an antidote to the growing influence of pan-Arab satellite television, specifically al-Jazeera. Finally, al-Iraqiya was intended to fill the information void in Iraq in the aftermath of the war, allowing the United States to get out in front of rumors as well as to give the coalition a forum for promoting its successes.


To their credit, all three of these outlets have quickly achieved significant market share and at least a modicum of credibility among their listeners and viewers (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2, page 96). Polling data show that 74 percent of Iraqis watch al-Iraqiya on at least a weekly basis and 21 percent of those consider it “objective.”<sup>9</sup> Al-Hurra, though not boasting ratings as high as al-Iraqiya’s, still claims a respectable average adult viewership of 29 percent in a dozen urban areas surveyed in North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf region. Just over half of its viewers rate its news coverage as “very reliable” or “somewhat reliable.” Finally, Radio Sawa has staked out a weekly following of 38 percent of listeners polled in six Arab countries, including a high of 73 percent in Morocco. Remarkably, four of five listeners feel its news meets the same reliability criteria. Thus, on the basis of both market penetration and trust, these initiatives certainly appear successful at first glance.

Although these surveys communicate a relatively positive picture, there are a number of key remaining barriers. In the case of al-Iraqiya, a ban on satellite dishes during Saddam Hussein’s rule, combined with the effects of sanctions and war, means much of Iraq is dependent on a very limited slate of terrestrial broadcasts. For most areas of the country, this implies a maximum of four channels: al-Iraqiya, al-Alam, al-Sharqiya, and in the vicinity of Basra and Baghdad, al-Hurra.<sup>10</sup> This state of affairs is further reinforced by sporadic censorship of the leading satellite networks, first by the Iraqi Governing Council and more recently by the Iraqi Interim Government.<sup>11</sup> Although 95 percent of Iraqis surveyed in an April 2004 CNN/USA *Today*/Gallup poll reported owning a working television set, one-third or fewer received satellite broadcasts such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya in their homes. In contrast, 84 percent affirmed receiving al-Iraqiya without difficulty. Given this dependence on al-Iraqiya, it should come as no surprise that the station has achieved significant market share. A lack of alternatives makes Iraqis a “captive audience,” in both the figurative and literal senses of the term. In fact,


**Table 5.1<sup>12</sup>**  
**U.S. SPONSORED ARABIC-LANGUAGE BROADCASTING**

Initiative	Launch Date	Project Description
Radio Sawa (Middle East Radio Network)	March 2002	An Arabic-language network that broadcasts music and news to a target audience of 15–29 year olds in the Middle East via a combination of FM, medium-wave, short-wave, digital audio satellite, and Internet transmission resources. Separate programming targets Iraq, Jordan, and the West Bank, the Persian Gulf, Egypt, and Morocco. All five streams share a differentiated music program; however, the news is similar on the four non-Iraq streams. Radio Sawa plays an even split of Western and Arab pop, interspersed with about 5 hours of news each 24 hour cycle.
Al-Hurra (Middle East Television Network)	February 2004	With a focus on attracting a broad audience in the Middle East, the al-Hurra satellite television channel provides news, current affairs, and entertainment programming on a 24 hours, 7 days a week, basis. In total, it reaches 22 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Programming focuses on news and information, including news updates twice an hour, two one-hour newscasts each evening, and current affairs talk shows. The channel also broadcasts information or educational shows on subjects including health and fitness, entertainment, sports, and science and technology.
Al-Iraqiya (Iraqi Media Network)	May 2003	Part of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), al-Iraqiya was initially set up by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) at the behest of the Defense Department. Al-Iraqiya broadcasts primarily news and information programming as well as a limited slate of Egyptian entertainment television, sports, and recycled MBC coverage. Recently, Harris Corp., in partnership with LBCI and al-Fawares, received a \$96 million contract to improve al-Iraqiya and expand IMN's presence to encompass two national radio channels, two national television channels, and a national newspaper. Al-Iraqiya is available through terrestrial broadcast.

**Figure 5.1**  
**Al-Hurra: Viewership and Perceived Reliability of News<sup>13</sup>**



**Figure 5.2**  
**Radio Sawa: Listeners and Perceived Reliability of News<sup>14</sup>**



for those that do have a choice, a State Department–commissioned poll conducted in October 2003 found that 63 percent preferred al-Jazeera or al-Arabiya as a source of their news to just 12 percent for al-Iraqiya.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, al-Hurra's market share cannot be explained away as simply default television viewing. With the exception of Iraq, where the United States has taken steps to make al-Hurra accessible via terrestrial broadcast,<sup>16</sup> the station is available only to those households with satellite dishes. As such, time spent watching al-Hurra represents a choice over other free-to-air channels, including al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, and so on. That said, given that the polling data presented in Figure 5.1 were compiled less than two months after its first broadcast, al-Hurra's ratings almost certainly reflect a bump due to its novelty. As the new player, and one whose launch generated a great deal of attention abroad, it makes sense that viewers would be curious to compare its content and formatting with other programming.


Because the figures include all respondents who acknowledged tuning in within the previous week, it is likely that most of those who responded positively were also supplementing their viewing with other news outlets. Thus, it is not possible to discern for what percentage of these viewers al-Hurra has supplanted pan-Arab or domestic media as their primary news source. Despite anecdotal reports that al-Hurra has been branded in the region as American propaganda, on balance those claims do not seem to be supported by the data.

Finally, with respect to Radio Sawa, there is a risk of overstating its influence by not accounting for the degree to which its listeners are self-selected. High-end estimates put its news coverage as a share of total programming at fifteen minutes of every hour.<sup>17</sup> Content is dominated by a mix of Arab and Western pop music designed to appeal to adolescents and young adults. This deliberate targeting of youth seems to be played out by Radio Sawa's actual following, given the fact that its weekly listenership within the fifteen-to-twenty-nine demographic is 69 percent higher than its share among the thirty-plus demographic.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to an audience that is heavily tilted toward a specific age structure, it is also self-selected on the basis of receptiveness to the United States (see Figure 5.3, page 98).<sup>19</sup>

On average, Radio Sawa listeners are more likely to be favorably inclined toward the United States vis-à-vis non-Radio Sawa listeners by a ratio of nearly two to one. Thus, in accounting for Radio Sawa's relative

**Figure 5.3**  
**Attitudes toward the United States among Radio Sawa**  
**Listeners and Nonlisteners<sup>20</sup>**



popularity, one must be careful not to conflate its appeal as entertainment value with more substantive influence. It would be a mistake (as well as condescending) to believe Arabs are not capable of drawing distinctions between American policies and popular culture. In the March 2003 Pew study, 42 percent of Jordanians and 57 percent of Moroccans reported liking American music, movies, and television, whereas 99 percent and 88 percent had unfavorable or very unfavorable opinions of the United States, respectively.<sup>21</sup>

## THE BATTLE OF IDEAS

One of the enduring questions that has emerged from the debate over public diplomacy is why the United States has been so ineffective in associating itself with the values (principally freedom) enshrined in its founding. Some advocates recommend that the United States define itself as a symbol of freedom through broadcasting, exchange programs, outreach, development assistance, and so forth.




Following this logic, the proposed solution is more trained Arabists, more resources for public affairs, and more measurements to judge performance. These solutions, however, are based on the faulty premise that the careful management of perception will allow the United States to improve its image abroad while essentially bracketing foreign policy. This strategy may help at the margins, winning over a few fence-sitters and agnostics, but it is unlikely to turn the tide in any meaningful way. The United States could do a better job promoting interventions that have aided Muslims, such as the military campaigns and subsequent humanitarian efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. And the United States should be urging the Arab world to reconcile the inconsistencies in Arabs' criticism of certain aspects of U.S. policy while failing to strongly condemn the behavior of Arab regimes in places like Darfur. Ultimately, these efforts are secondary to America's performance in Iraq, its role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the character of its relationships with governments in the region.

In the March 2003 Telhami/Zogby poll, respondents were asked whether their "attitudes toward the United States are based more on your values as an Arab or on American foreign policy in the Middle East?" In each survey country, a plurality indicated that their opinion was influenced more by foreign policy considerations (see Figure 5.4, page 100). In short, these results confirm that much like the American public, Arabs care mostly about facts on the ground. There is nothing incongruous about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and the values and aspirations of Arabs, but large majorities of those living in the Middle East and North Africa do evaluate U.S. foreign policy as out of step with their own worldview.

Of course, on no issue is the divide greater than with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not surprisingly, the Pew Center recently found that 96 percent of Palestinians, 94 percent of Moroccans, 77 percent of Kuwaitis, 99 percent of Jordanians, and 90 percent of Lebanese believe that U.S. policies in the Middle East "favor Israel too much."<sup>22</sup> Given the importance of this issue in the Arab world, there is little doubt that this fuels much of the animosity felt by Arabs toward the United States. Like all states in the international system, the United States must pursue policies based on self-interest, the special relationship with Israel included. However, realism also dictates that the United States internalize the cost of lost popular support in the region. Operating under the assumption that this can be offset or wished away through spin or smart campaigning is simply wishful thinking.

**Figure 5.4**  
**Basis for Attitude toward the U.S.<sup>23</sup>**



More important, an attempt to have it both ways is frequently counterproductive, leading to greater suspicion and prohibiting the United States from gaining any traction even when it is prepared to cede important points. This dynamic characterized the guarded reaction to President Bush's remarkable statements regarding "failed" U.S. Middle East policy in his November 2003 speech in the United Kingdom. Calling on the imperative of spreading freedom, Bush acknowledged, "We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Long-standing ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites."<sup>24</sup> With the air already poisoned by Iraq and continued violence in Israel and Palestine, this mea culpa generated very little (if any) goodwill.<sup>25</sup> Simply put, U.S. action abroad sets the context for dialogue, and even significant shifts in rhetoric vis-à-vis the Middle East will remain a distant second to recorded votes (in the UN), the distribution of aid, and observable interventions. This is particularly true when those interventions are as momentous as regime change in Iraq and tend to reinforce the prevailing views of what really drives American foreign policy.

The United States needs to move beyond the model of public diplomacy employed during the Cold War. Instead of treating public diplomacy as a lever of influence, it may be time for the United States to lower its expectations and consider that approach to be a more modest element of a process of dialogue—not an instrument or a means to an end, but an end in itself. Given the trajectory of America’s standing in the Arab world, this alone could be considered progress. Additionally, being more choosy in its appeals and working to divorce day-to-day information flow from policy objectives will ultimately help restore the credibility of the message. Until the United States reaches that point, overloading the airwaves cannot hope to produce the desired effect.

## **SUPPORT FROM MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS**

The ability of Muslim governments to help the United States win greater understanding for its policies and objectives is limited by their own lack of credibility. Decades of controlled press reporting, government-owned broadcasting—which did little beyond televising footage from government meetings—and extravagant lies have undercut public trust. Mamoun Fandy has argued that trust in Arab Muslim societies derives from confidence in the “chain of transmission.” In much the same way, Muslim scholars have assessed the reliability of traditions about the Prophet on the basis of *isnad*, the intergenerational record of the eminences who relayed these stories to one another over the course of centuries. In this chain of transmission, people whom one knows personally are to be trusted; impersonal institutions, such as a government repeatedly caught in lies, has no place in the chain. The problem is that the trustworthiness of a person who passes a story on to his friend may far exceed the trustworthiness of the material he passes on. Thus, outlandish stories about the United States might be perceived to be more credible if heard from a trusted source than more commonsensical accounts emanating from governments or media outlets perceived to be in league with, or controlled by, governments.

A related barrier to trust has been erected by Osama bin Laden and his spokesmen, who have argued that impious Muslims and infidels have constructed a vast edifice of lies intended to conceal the true nature of reality from honest Muslims. The implicit claim is that any assertion by

the United States or its Muslim puppets is necessarily false. The truth can be inferred as the opposite of whatever the United States says. As an example, when the United States elected to support the road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace, bin Laden denounced it as a sly maneuver that was actually intended to enslave Palestinians. Similarly, Western intervention on behalf of Muslims in the Balkans has been dismissed as a ruse to further the denigration of Muslims.

Another impediment to a U.S. partnership with local governments in an effort to foster dialogue and improve America's image lies within these governments themselves. The Egyptian and Saudi governments, for example, not only permit but deliberately echo and reinforce anti-American themes in a bid to buttress their popular legitimacy. This policy, generally defended in a disingenuous way as respect for free expression, is a key element of their strategy for clinging to power while avoiding serious reforms. We therefore need to bear in mind, as we contemplate ways to enlist these governments in a campaign to improve Muslim understanding of the United States, that we will in effect be asking them to undercut their own perceived interests.

Nevertheless, several short- and long-term initiatives are worth considering. Among the short-term steps would be greater accuracy in official statements about issues involving the United States. In particular, governments in the region could contribute to a better public understanding of American motives by avoiding gross mischaracterizations of American actions and their consequences. This does not require that governments concur in U.S. policy or publicly support it. But it does mean that members of the political elite, including heads of government, refrain from saying, for example, that the United States has perpetrated massacres or is engaged in Iraq for reasons of conquest and enrichment. Given the linkage between the United States and Israel that many in the region take for granted, leaders should take care to cast their statements on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a way that does not exaggerate the level of violence, addresses the issue of blame in a more evenhanded way, and acknowledges the history of U.S. efforts to bring the parties to a settlement.

Senior members of the Egyptian government, for example, concede that Arafat's leadership has impeded the Palestinian ability to capitalize on Israeli concessions and win American support. Yet these officials would never make such statements to their own publics. All governments engage in a form of diglossia—speaking in one “language” to domestic audiences and in another to foreign interlocutors. We should not expect

foreign governments to be purer than our own in this respect. Yet a greater convergence between the rather more sophisticated views they express in private and the statements they make in public would be constructive.

Medium-term measures might include government help in countering the baneful exuberance of the media regarding the United States. Washington cannot, of course, encourage censorship. But foreign leaders can directly challenge the more pernicious claims that appear frequently in regional media regarding U.S. aims and objectives in the region. Elites can take a strongly vocal stance toward anti-Semitic stories that not only demonize Israel but, more important, purport that the United States is under the control of Jews and seeks to advance Jewish interests. Governments that are themselves suspected by their publics of participation in American plans for domination of the region will not persuade many that grand conspiracy theories are wrong. Nonetheless, they will convince some; and it is essential that these often bizarre stories be challenged in Arabic by Arabs. Government silence constitutes implicit concurrence in these myths and enhances their power.

Although the appearance of such stories and the prevalence of inaccurate reporting are due as much to editorial agendas as to low standards among reporters, government funding for journalism training would improve the quality of reporting over time.

One of the obstacles to better intercultural comprehension is a set of deeply embedded, negative beliefs about the United States. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit have called these formulaic notions “Occidentalism,” in homage to the late Edward Said, who had earlier dissected a reciprocal set of ideas about the Arab world that pervaded Western scholarship for many years—“Orientalism.” Occidentalist views hold that the United States is a soulless place enslaved to technology, where money is all-important, morals are low or nonexistent, pornography and degradation of women are ubiquitous, and violence permeates society and governs foreign policy. Sayyid Qutb, the Salafi thinker executed by the Egyptian government in 1965, wrote the classic statement of this view upon his return from a year in the United States.

Like all stereotypes, there is a grain of truth in these images; taken as a whole, however, they are highly misleading and open the door to misunderstanding of specific actions or statements by the United States about matters that concern Muslims generally and Arabs in particular. Governments might help counter these Occidentalist beliefs by enriching

public discussion of American history and culture. Toward this end, governments could subsidize or otherwise encourage documentaries about the United States and sponsor in-depth reporting about American life and history that reveals the flaws in common stereotypes about America. This could not be expected to rapidly reverse resentments against the United States, if only because there are aspects to American life and society that resemble the stereotype. It would, however, engender a sense of the complexity of American life and perhaps—over time—erode the widespread impression that our society is fundamentally alien.

Another significant obstacle to better understanding lies in the power of the pulpit. Clerical preaching about the United States has become more negative over the past decade. This is true not only in the Middle East but in other countries where there are a large number of Muslims, including Nigeria, Indonesia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan. Religious language is a powerful conveyor of values and ideas. As a result, preaching that demonizes the United States, portraying it as singularly opposed to Islam, and perpetuating Occidentalist perceptions of American society, can do much to damage the position of the United States.

In many Middle Eastern countries, there are limits to what clerics can say overtly. Scriptural language, however, offers numberless “coded” ways to refer to the United States, without referring explicitly to the United States or its actions. Moreover, the mosque is not the only platform for anti-American preaching. Star-quality clerics are recorded for wide dissemination via audiotape, and their cassettes are available in markets all over the region. Preachers who take a more moderate line are often thought of as “ulema as-Sulta”—essentially government parrots—and therefore disregarded. Against this background, options open to governments are obviously limited. Despite these constraints, governments could indirectly sponsor moderate clerics who believe in the compatibility of Islam with Western values and stress Islam’s nonviolent dimension. The difficult pieces of this stratagem are the scarcity of clerics who hold these views, the chilling effect of radical preachers on those who do hold moderate views, and the relative obscurity and generally low-wattage delivery of moderate sheikhs. (Safar al-Hawali, a fiery Saudi preacher who has been “turned” by the Saudi government, is a useful counterexample.) These constraints, however, are not necessarily fatal. The United States and its foreign partners might usefully discuss the feasibility of efforts to shape clerical discourse in a way that fosters greater understanding of the United States.

Over the long term, the best thing Arab governments can do is improve their educational systems and reform outdated curricula. Spending is not the problem; budgets for education as a share of government spending are extraordinarily high throughout the region. But poorly educated teachers, instructional methods that do not foster critical thinking, and obsolete curricular materials are common problems. In countries where the Saudi *tawhid* curriculum has been established, suspicion of non-Muslims and disregard for their religious beliefs are curricular objectives. Unless and until these shortcomings are remedied, American expectations of a more informed discourse about the United States—and a greater willingness to consider its side of the story—are unlikely to be met.

Finally, there is the issue of context. In recent years, American actions and self-expression have reinforced many of the pernicious beliefs that the United States wishes to counteract. Unless Americans give greater thought to the effect of their actions on the views of others, a focus on what foreign governments can do to reverse negative views of the United States will prove unavailing.

In order to win the “Battle of Ideas,” the United States must leverage the power and attractiveness of common values that we share with the Islamic world. In the wake of Abu Ghraib, we must work even harder to overcome misunderstandings and the propaganda that terrorists use to expand their spheres of influence. Together with the Europeans, we must engage in a concerted program to fight religious intolerance against Islam, at home and abroad. These efforts must support human rights agendas and strengthen educational systems and economic opportunities, especially for women.

In addition to countering the jihadist terrorists with law enforcement, intelligence, and military measures, we must erode support for them in the Islamic world through what the 9/11 Commission called the “Battle of Ideas.” Nations other than the United States (including both Islamic and non-Islamic countries) and nongovernmental organizations must take the lead in active programs to appeal to Muslims to denounce intolerance and terrorist violence done in the name of Islam. These efforts must stress our common values and overcome misunderstandings and terrorist propaganda. Reactivating the Israel-Palestine peace process must be a part of this larger effort.

As part of the Battle of Ideas, the United States and Europe must demonstrably welcome Islam as a part of their cultures. For Europe,

that means both fighting anti-Islamic discrimination in European Union countries and initiating discussions on Turkey's accession to the European Union.

Turkey is an Islamic democracy, with a free press and equal rights for women. It allows religious freedom and combats the jihadists. Yet Turkey's long-term stability and its ability to resist jihadist forces is dependent upon its economic health. That health is, in turn, almost certainly dependent upon its admission to the European Union. Turkey can be a model and a partner for other Islamic nations, or it can devolve into the kind of chaos that we have witnessed in Pakistan and Algeria. The difference depends upon whether the EU nations can overcome their own racism and prejudices, whether they will insist that the EU is a "Christian" entity. Thus, for both the European Union and the United States, winning the Battle of Ideas means a concerted program to fight religious intolerance against Islam on every front.

Although jihadist terrorists are often not poor or uneducated, they use the underprivileged populations in some Islamic nations as one base for their support and as a lever for undermining national stability. The United States, the European Union, and the international financial institutions must greatly expand their financial and programmatic support for development efforts in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, and other economically challenged Islamic nations. These efforts must support human rights efforts and strengthen educational systems and economic opportunities, especially for women.