

3. THE HYDRA OF JIHAD

To devise plans to counter the jihadist terrorist threat, we must understand in some detail its various manifestations, which vary by region. In this chapter, we examine twelve jihadist terrorist groups and four radicalizing organizations—that is, apparently nonviolent groups that advocate the same goals as the terrorists. Specialists will argue that other groups are equally worthy of inclusion. This analysis is not meant to exhaustively include the entire, ever-changing landscape of jihadists but rather is intended to detail most of the major groupings and to provide a general understanding of the jihadist hydra and its regional manifestations.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)

GROUP LEADER(S): Khadaffy Janjalani is the nominal leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (Bearer of the Sword) and younger brother of the group's late founder, Abdurajak Janjalani. Abu Soliaman is a senior officer and group spokesman. Other key leaders include Isnilon Hapilon (operations chief), Radulan Sahiron (military commander), and Dr. Abu Pula (commander and paramedical expert). Senior leader Binang Andang was captured on August 1, 2004.

CURRENT SIZE: ASG has a core of several hundred fighters, but the group is highly fragmented, so estimates of size vary. Before concentrated Philippine military action against the group started in 2000 following a spate of high-profile kidnappings, the group was thought to have as many as 4,000 members. Although the U.S.-backed campaign against

ASG significantly reduced its numbers, a sizable income from kidnap ransom probably allows the group to currently support somewhat fewer than 1,000 fighters, excluding a larger noncombatant support network. Some Philippine authorities argue that the group has as few as 300 fighters.

HISTORY: Abdurajak Janjalani founded ASG in 1991, splitting from its forerunner, the Moro National Liberation Front. Janjalani was an ex-mujahideen fighter in the Afghan-Soviet war, and his quest to establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia began with a bloody campaign in the southern Philippines. ASG used kidnappings, bombs, and grenade attacks on Christian targets and foreigners to advance its objectives, conducting over 100 terrorist incidents in its first four years. For its series of attacks, ASG was listed by the U.S. State Department as a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997. As members of the criminal networks in the Philippines secured leadership positions in the group, a profit-driven kidnapping strategy began to eclipse ASG's Islamic ideology. This trend increased following Janjalani's death in late 1998, as the group fragmented into a quasi-confederation made up of primarily five bandit subgroups. In April 2000, ASG elements kidnapped twenty-one people, including ten Westerners, from two resorts in Malaysia. During the rest of 2000, a French film crew, twelve Christian Evangelists, and more than a dozen Filipinos were also taken hostage. Although some were rescued and a few released, the ASG reportedly earned millions in ransom payments, including a large amount from Libya in exchange for the remaining Westerners taken from the Malaysian resorts. American Jeffrey Schilling was also taken by an ASG subgroup in August but escaped from his captors in April 2001. In May 2001, another large group of people, including three Americans, was kidnapped from a resort in the southern Philippines. American Guillermo Sobero was executed in June, and several Filipino Christians were beheaded as well over the course of the year. American Martin Burnham was killed, and his wife injured, during a Philippine army rescue attempt in June 2002.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Al Qaeda's links to ASG are very strong. Under Abdurajak Janjalani's leadership, the group likely received regular financial support from Osama bin Laden during the 1990s. A number of its fighters likely trained in Afghanistan, including twenty group leaders who allegedly trained at an al Qaeda camp near Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan in 2001. Janjalani also had strong ties to bin Laden's

brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who lived in the Philippines until 1996 and whose financial outlays for Islamic charities in Mindanao provided training and funds for ASG. Al Qaeda members Khalid Shaikh Muhammad and Ramzi Yousef worked on the Bojinka Plot to bomb U.S. airliners and assassinate the pope in late 1994 and early 1995 but do not appear to have had ASG assistance in their planning. Both extremists took scuba diving lessons in the southern Philippines during that period, however, and the trips may have been cover for the training of ASG members. Intelligence officials contend that two al Qaeda members were inside an ASG base on Basilan Island in the Philippines on the day after the 9/11 attacks.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Since 9/11, ASG has been involved in hundreds of kidnappings, largely victimizing the local populations of the southern Philippines. In August 2002, the group kidnapped six Filipino Jehovah's Witnesses and beheaded two of them. In October 2002, the group bombed a restaurant across from a Philippine military base, killing three Filipinos and one U.S. serviceman. In February 2004, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion on a passenger ferry near the Philippine capital of Manila, which killed 130 passengers. ASG group leader Galib Andang (also known as Commander Robot), who was responsible for many of the kidnappings and beheadings of the prior years, was captured in Sulu in December 2003. Police arrested six members of ASG in March 2004 who were plotting bomb attacks on shopping malls, trains, Western embassies, and other targets in Manila. In June 2004, during the country's Independence Day celebration, one policeman was killed and two were wounded while trying to disarm a bomb placed by ASG operatives in the Plaza Rizal shopping center in Sulu Province in the southern Philippines.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: The loose cell structure, inhospitable terrain, and wide support network in Sulu and Basilan provinces will continue to make it difficult for Filipino forces to eliminate the ASG. The various ASG elements will likely continue to operate in subgroups, focusing on Christian and Western targets of opportunity in the southern Philippines. The group will also likely try to stage more attacks in the metro Manila area in order to terrorize the populace and to try to undermine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's administration.

ASG also seems to have made a few tactical shifts in recent months. First, recent attacks suggest the group may be developing an increased capacity for attacks on soft targets outside of the Mindanao and Sulu areas. Second, Filipino officials claim that ASG has made significant links to the deadliest Southeast Asian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Officials argue that ASG has provided sanctuary for JI operatives in return for training. Third, there is evidence that the group's leader, Khadaffy Janjalani, is attempting to renew the group's focus on establishing an Islamic state in the southern Philippines. These three trends suggest that ASG has become, and will continue to be, increasingly receptive to the agendas, tactics, and ideologies of al Qaeda and other regional terrorist groups.

JEMAAH ISLAMIYA (JI)

GROUP LEADER(S): The two most prominent current JI leaders in Indonesia are Azahari Husin, a senior planner and explosives expert, and his associate Noordin Mohammad Top. Other key leaders include Nuim, alias Zuhroni (a veteran of the Afghan mujahideen and a major recruiter for the Ambon and Maluku conflicts), Abdul Rahim Ayub (alleged leader of JI's Australia operations), Zulkarnaen (the head of JI military operations and a member of the JI central command), and Dulmatin (an explosives expert). A key leader known as Mustaqim was arrested in August 2004. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, JI's spiritual leader, has been in jail since October 2002 on charges of planning to assassinate current Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri and for his involvement in a series of church bombings in 2000 in Indonesia and the Philippines.

CURRENT SIZE: JI has experienced several major setbacks in the last few years, including the capture of its operational chief, Nurjaman Riduan Ismuddin (also known as Hambali), in Thailand in August 2003. Currently, 200 men with alleged links to JI are in custody in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. But JI is believed to have grown to at least several thousand members and remains a threat. In addition, JI has cultivated links to local separatist and militant Islamic groups in Southeast Asia, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and ASG.

HISTORY: JI was formally established on January 1, 1993. Most of its senior leadership had previously trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. JI adopted the goal of creating an Islamic state in Southeast Asia by 2025 comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand. The JI network has thrived on ideological indoctrination, which is conducted at terror training camps throughout Southeast Asia and at a collection of Muslim boarding schools, known as pesantren, where young students are taught jihadist principles. JI has a loosely organized cell structure that is heavily dependent on a complicated web of marriage alliances that makes JI seem like one large extended family. Riduan Ismuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, a former senior attack planner, was widely regarded as JI's operational chief and played a key leadership role in the organization until his capture in August 2003. He was closely involved in many terrorist plots, headed JI's regional policymaking body, and is suspected of also being head of al Qaeda's operations for East Asia. Hambali was likely involved in one of the group's first international attacks, an August 2000 car bomb attack on the Jakarta home of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, in which the ambassador was wounded and two others were killed.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: JI has numerous and well-documented ties to al Qaeda. Some U.S. officials and terrorism experts believe that JI is a subdivision of al Qaeda. Other experts believe that the JI network is not subservient to al Qaeda but rather cooperates with bin Laden's organization when it is mutually beneficial. JI has received funding and logistical assistance from al Qaeda. A Yemeni operative named Syafullah allegedly surfaced in Bali a few days before the October 2002 bombings and then left the night of the bombings. In return, JI has cased targets and assisted al Qaeda members' travels through Southeast Asia. Prominently, Hambali arranged a meeting between two of the 9/11 hijackers and key al Qaeda figures in Malaysia in January 2000. Hambali also arranged for a group of JI teenagers, including Hambali's younger brother, to study at religious madrassas in Karachi, Pakistan, prior to the 9/11 attacks. The "al-Ghuraba" cell members allegedly received training in weapons and explosives training in Afghanistan, and some met with bin Laden. The cell was disrupted in September 2003, and all of the members were

deported back to Malaysia and Indonesia. Five were charged with having trained to carry out attacks on behalf of al Qaeda against American interests in Malaysia, though no specific targets were specified.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: U.S. officials maintain that Hambali was helping to develop an al Qaeda chemical and biological weapons program before it was disrupted by the invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. There is evidence that JI and al Qaeda planners were preparing to coordinate a 9/11 “second strike” on U.S. West Coast targets with planes hijacked in Southeast Asia. In December 2001, authorities in Singapore discovered a JI plot to attack U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic targets in Singapore. In October 2002, JI executed the Bali nightclub blasts, which killed 202. The blasts targeted Western tourists and used an electronic trigger to detonate a 300-pound ammonium nitrate fertilizer car bomb. That same month, JI was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. JI operatives were also involved in bombings at Davao International Airport and Davao Wharf, both in the Philippines, in the spring of 2003. In June, another JI plot to attack several Western embassies and tourist sites in Singapore was disrupted. The August J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, which killed twelve, targeted Americans and U.S. government officials and used a suicide car bomb. In October 2003, Filipino police raided a JI safe house in the Philippines and found bomb-making materials and manuals in Indonesian describing how to make biological and chemical weapons. Traces of biological weapons were also allegedly found in the apartment. In June 2004, it was reported that JI had sent a special terrorist cell into Indonesia to assassinate diplomats from Australia and other Western countries.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: Although JI has recently weathered numerous setbacks, such as the capture of some of its most influential leaders, the so-called second generation of JI leaders is innovating and could develop an even more effective organization than previously existed. The “second generation” of JI leaders appears to be even more dedicated to jihad than its predecessors. Many of these new leaders are the children of JI members. Indoctrinated with JI’s mission and tactics from their youth, they were able to train in Indonesian religious clashes in the Ambon and Poso regions and have vowed to spawn new terrorist cells to continue their holy war. There

is some evidence that this second generation of JI leaders may be even more sympathetic to bin Laden's call to adopt increasing violent tactics against Western targets. At the same time, there is evidence that a rift within JI is emerging with regard to how and when the group should wage its jihad. Most disturbingly, JI seems bent on developing chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and the recently discovered chem-bio manual in the Philippines is an indicator that the group continues to explore their development.

MIDDLE EAST—AFRICA

AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI)

GROUP LEADER(S): Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki is a key Somalia-based AIAI faction leader and supporter of al Qaeda. The U.S. secretary of state has placed al-Turki on the U.S. terrorist list, claiming he is “associated with al Qaeda and has provided support for acts of terrorism.” Somaliland sources have identified Mohamed Ali as the group's leader for the Togdheer region in central Somaliland.

CURRENT SIZE: U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that AIAI has around 2,000 members, though only a portion of the group is considered actively militant. After incurring heavy losses in battles with the Ethiopian military, the group now operates mostly in small cells.

HISTORY: AIAI emerged in Somalia in the early 1990s after the regime of Siad Barre collapsed in 1991. As factions fought for territory, AIAI carved a spot for itself in the Gedo region, where the borders of Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia converge. AIAI hoped to turn Somalia into a fundamentalist Islamic state, and to achieve this goal the group began establishing regional Islamic schools and aid agencies. To avoid being targeted, AIAI integrated itself into the local communities and quickly won local support as it delivered relief services to the poorest communities. AIAI's regional ambitions grew, and it adopted the goal of creating a fundamentalist Islamic state in the Horn of Africa, though it continued to conduct the majority of its attacks against Ethiopia. AIAI is believed to be

responsible for numerous bomb attacks on soft targets in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, between 1996 and 1997. In June 1998, the group kidnapped six International Red Cross members in Ethiopia, releasing them unharmed a month later. In April 2000, AIAI attacked and killed twelve Ethiopian soldiers. AIAI has mostly operated in small units using guerrilla warfare tactics and explosives' expertise to inflict maximum damage on their victims. AIAI has mainly operated in Somalia but maintains a limited presence in Kenya and Ethiopia. The group has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Although some Somalia experts, such as Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service, contend that AIAI's strength and links to international terrorists are exaggerated, several U.S. officials have argued that AIAI received weapons and funding from bin Laden in the late 1990s. Despite this, AIAI has not yet been designated a foreign terrorist organization. On March 11, 2002, the United States charged the Somalia branch of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation with supporting terrorist activities, including support for both AIAI and al Qaeda. On March 19, 2004, attacks on aid workers in Somaliland led to the arrest of five men who admitted to being members of AIAI and a part of an al Qaeda cell. Although these events do not provide incontrovertible evidence of cooperation between the two groups, the data suggest that a cooperative arrangement between AIAI and al Qaeda is highly possible.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Israeli and U.S. officials suspect that members of AIAI assisted an al Qaeda cell in carrying out a suicide car bomb attack on a hotel in Kenya in November 2002, which killed eleven Kenyans and three Israelis, and a simultaneous failed attempt to shoot down a chartered El Al airliner that was leaving Nairobi and carrying Israeli tourists. AIAI members are suspected to be the perpetrators of a grenade attack on an Ethio-Kenyan Hotel in May 2003. The group killed two British teachers in Somaliland in October 2003 and was almost certainly responsible for the March 2004 attack on a German Agency for Technical Assistance (GTZ) vehicle in Somaliland, in which a Kenyan and a Somali were killed and a German was wounded. AIAI has also continued to engage in firefights and bombings against Ethiopian forces in eastern Ethiopia.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: An FBI counterterrorism report from March 2003 maintained that AIAI and al Qaeda members were receiving scuba diving training in Somalia in order to prepare for attacks on ships. If the report is accurate, then AIAI is probably trying to develop the capability to mount attacks on ships passing around the Horn of Africa. AIAI members will likely continue to provide support to remaining East Africa-based al Qaeda members, and the group will continue efforts to expand the amount of territory it controls. In general, AIAI is purported to be well organized and highly insular. Thus, counterterrorism officials in the region will continue to find it very difficult to infiltrate the organization.

ISLAMIC ARMY OF ADEN-ABYAN (IAA)

GROUP LEADER(S): Khalid Abdulnabi, the leader of IAA, was recently apprehended by Yemeni authorities and then pardoned by Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with many other captured militants, who claimed they had reformed themselves. It remains unclear whether Abdulnabi will retain a central role in IAA leadership and operations. Another key figure is Abu Hamza al-Masri, the self-described media adviser to IAA. Abu Hamza resides in London where he was, until recently, preaching at the Finsbury Park Mosque. British authorities arrested him in May 2004, and both the U.S. and Yemeni governments have requested his extradition.

CURRENT SIZE: The current size of IAA is unknown.

HISTORY: The Sunni militant group emerged in 1998 when it issued a series of statements in support of Osama bin Laden, called for the overthrow of the Yemeni government, and encouraged operations against U.S. and other Western interests in Yemen. Led by Zein al-Abidin al-Mihdar (a.k.a. Abu al-Hassan) and operating primarily in Yemen's southern governorates of Aden and Abyan, IAA has argued that Yemen's government is not implementing shari'a law properly. The group had ties with al Qaeda since its founding, providing safe haven in exchange for funding. In December 1998, the group abducted sixteen British, American, and Australian tourists in southern Yemen, four of whom

were killed during a rescue attempt. On October 12, 2000, al Qaeda operatives successfully attacked the USS *Cole*, killing seventeen U.S. sailors, injuring thirty-nine, and causing over \$250 million in damage. IAA issued a communiqué through Abu Hamza in the United Kingdom claiming responsibility, although bin Laden was later identified as having personally approved the attack. The day after the *Cole* attack, IAA attempted a Molotov cocktail attack on the British Embassy in Yemen's capital, Sanaa. The group has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: A government crackdown on IAA in 1999 led to the execution of its chief, Abu Bakr al-Mehdar. Following the crackdown, IAA retreated to Hatat, Yemen, where the group incorporated al Qaeda members into its ranks. More recently, IAA provided vocal support for bin Laden's terrorist activities and may have provided logistical support for al Qaeda operations, including the failed attempt to bomb the USS *Sullivan* and the successful attack on the USS *Cole*. Although IAA is independent from al Qaeda, the group has clearly established significant ties to al Qaeda and has facilitated al Qaeda activities in Yemen in the past. Following some government successes against both groups, it is unknown how extensive current ties are.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: IAA has been very active since September 11 and has made numerous attempts on high-profile Western targets. A string of bombings in 2001 was attributed to IAA, with targets including an Anglican Church in Aden and the Yemen-Intercontinental Hotel. IAA members were captured in 2001 while plotting to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa. In October 2002, the group claimed responsibility for an al Qaeda suicide boat attack on the French oil tanker *Limburg*, killing one person, injuring several, and spilling oil into the Hadramawt waters off the coast of Yemen. The group likely did conduct a June 2003 attack on a medical assistance convoy in the Abyan Governate of Yemen.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: Due to the general lawlessness, wide availability of weaponry, and tribal control of many Yemeni provinces, the country will continue to be vulnerable to al Qaeda and IAA operatives unless there are dramatic changes in Yemen's counterterrorism policies. Yemeni president Saleh has periodically ordered the release of jailed terror suspects, including members of IAA, who have been "reeducated" and have supposedly renounced terrorism.

IAA will most likely continue to attack high-profile Western targets, possibly preying on targets of opportunity in Yemen's ungoverned hinterlands, as well as in unprotected ports and bays along the Yemeni coast.

SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT (GSPC)

GROUP LEADER(S): The head of GSPC, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed by the Algerian Army in June 2004, and the two most likely successors are Yahya Jawadi, a member of al-Fath Battalion, which operates in Algeria's eastern and southeastern districts, and Abu-Ammar, leader of the group in the west. Amari Saifi (also known as General Abderrezak "the Para") is a senior leader of GSPC currently being held in detention by the Chadian rebel group the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT). MDJT has agreed to turn Abderrezak over to Algerian authorities, but the group has not yet done so. Abu-Yasir Sayyaf is a prominent member of the GSPC's information council, and Tarek Maaroufi is a key figure in GSPC's recruiting and cell-coordinating operations in Europe. Maaroufi is wanted in Italy, but authorities are unable to extradite him because of his Belgian citizenship.

CURRENT SIZE: GSPC's strength is unknown, but estimates range from 300 to 700 members spread throughout Algeria and Europe.

HISTORY: With the help of bin Laden, GSPC grew out of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the largest terrorist group in Algeria in the early 1990s. In that decade, GIA and GSPC together were responsible for the deaths of over 100,000 Algerians. By 1998, GSPC had surpassed GIA as the most effective terrorist group in Algeria; by 2000, the group had taken over GIA's networks of operatives and funding across Europe and North Africa. Haydar Abu Doha (also known as "The Doctor") played a large role in GSPC's transformation from a local armed group to an international terrorist organization. Using its new links to Europe, GSPC recruited heavily among the large base of Algerian teenagers on the continent, with particular success in France. GSPC dedicated itself to toppling the Algerian government as well as to conducting operations against Western targets in North Africa. The depth of its network in Europe was apparent when Italian police discovered a cell in Milan in April 2000 and French police discovered a cell in France in 2000.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Bin Laden helped to establish GSPC in the late 1990s as an alternative to GIA. GSPC leader Doha served as a senior figure at one of al Qaeda's Afghan terrorist camps before moving to the United Kingdom in 1999. After GSPC assumed control of GIA's networks in Europe, the group began to leverage its European contacts to facilitate al Qaeda funding and recruiting on the continent. Some experts believe that GSPC worked closely with al Qaeda experts from Georgia's Pankisi Gorge to establish a "ricin network" throughout Europe. Partially in response to the group's increasing international links, the group was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in March 2002. When Nabil Sahraoui took over leadership of GSPC in September 2003, he declared the group's alliance to al Qaeda.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: On January 4, 2003, GSPC killed fifty-one Algerian security personnel, which is the greatest loss ever by the Algerian Army from a single guerrilla attack. In February 2003, GSPC kidnapped thirty-one European tourists in the Algerian desert and the German government paid the group 5 million Euros for their release. In June 2004, the GSPC "al-Borkane" cell attacked the Hamma Power Station near Algiers with a truck bomb, damaging Algeria's most important electricity production facility and injuring eleven.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: GSPC has dispersed itself across the border regions of Algeria, Mali, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, and will therefore be difficult to contain in North Africa and the Sahel. In July 2004, a GSPC camp was discovered in the mountains of Tibesti, which span Libya's southern border with Chad. GSPC has also established a sophisticated recruiting network across Europe, which makes prevention of the emergence of new cells in Europe very difficult. The Dutch Internal Security Agency reported recently that GSPC has been recruiting young Muslim immigrants at mosques in the Netherlands. Algerian GSPC member Mohammed Bouhmedi was recently arrested in France after training in Belgium to become a diver. French authorities suspected that he was planning a maritime terrorist attack.

SALAFIYA JIHADIYA

GROUP LEADER(S): Abdelkrim Mejati is a top leader in Salafiya Jihadiya and is reported to be one of the masterminds of the group's massive attacks in Casablanca in May 2003. Also serving as an operative for al Qaeda, Mejati is an explosives expert, is married to an American, and visited the United States during 2001. British-born Youssef El-Jamaïqui is also believed to be a key operative for Salafiya Jihadiya.

CURRENT SIZE: Moroccan officials believe that 300 members of Salafiya Jihadiya attended al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The total group membership is most likely higher, given that the group recruits heavily in poor suburbs of several Moroccan cities.

HISTORY: Salafiya Jihadiya, created by former Afghan mujahideen, became active in the 1990s. The group was founded on Wahhabi principles, and the group's spiritual leader, Mohammad al-Fizazi, preached anti-Western messages in Tangiers before receiving a thirty-year prison sentence for inciting violence in Morocco. Some of its members have come from middle-class backgrounds, having become frustrated by their secondary status in Europe, but many have been recruited from slums in Morocco. Most of its core members have received training in al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan. The group has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Salafiya Jihadiya has sent many members to train in Afghan terror camps and the group has also received some direction and funding from al Qaeda. In spite of its numerous links to al Qaeda, the planning and execution for its operations, including the bombings in Casablanca, are largely homegrown.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: In mid-May 2003, Salafiya Jihadiya launched coordinated suicide bombing attacks on multiple targets in Casablanca, including an old Jewish cemetery, a luxury hotel, the Belgian consulate, a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, and a Spanish social club. The attacks killed forty-three and injured 100 people. One of the key planners of the attacks, Pierre Robert, converted to Islam in

1990 and is alleged to have links with al Qaeda. Robert is also alleged to have been planning more terrorist attacks in Europe, including an attack on a French nuclear power plant. In September 2003, Moroccan police disrupted a Salafiya Jihadiya cell in Rabat and arrested twenty-four group members. The group included two sisters who had agreed to attack soft targets, including a supermarket that had been selected eight months prior. Spanish investigators found that the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)—responsible for the infamous Madrid bombings, which killed almost 200 people in mid-March 2004—has connections to Salafiya Jihadiya. Sixteen of those arrested in Spain during investigations were said to be members of Al Oussououd Al Khalidine (The Eternal Lions), which is a Salafiya Jihadiya cell in Spain.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: Salafiya Jihadiya may have incurred a major setback in the immediate aftermath of the Casablanca bombings, when Moroccan authorities purportedly arrested between 100 and 200 suspected members. The group has a deep roster, however, and as one Moroccan official put it, “You have to assume that if there were fifteen willing to blow themselves up, there are dozens more still waiting in line.” The disruption of several more cells since the 2003 Casablanca attacks indicates that the group continues to actively recruit and plan for additional attacks.

IRAQ

JAMA’AT AL-TAWHID W’AL-JIHAD (JTJ)

GROUP LEADER(S): Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi leads JTJ. His subcommanders in JTJ are likely experienced Jordanians, Syrians, and possibly Iraqi Kurds he has worked with in the past. Zarqawi, who grew up in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan and went to Afghanistan in the late 1980s, developed ties to future al Qaeda members. After being imprisoned in Jordan in 1992–1999 for conspiring to overthrow the monarchy and establish an Islamic caliphate, he returned to Afghanistan and ran his own al Qaeda-linked training camp near Herat. Zarqawi is a follower of the extreme Takfiri ideology of Sunni Islam, in which all

non-Muslims, as well as all Shia, are considered apostates who should be killed if they do not convert. Although Zarqawi has close ties to Osama bin Laden, he never swore the oath of Bayat (allegiance) to him and appears to be setting his own agenda with JTJ attacks on coalition, Iraqi government, and Shia targets. Zarqawi played an integral part in al Qaeda planning for attacks to take place in Jordan as part of the Millennium Plot in late 1999. The foiled plot would have targeted Westerners and Israelis at Western hotels in Amman, including the Radisson SAS. For his part in the plot, Zarqawi was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death.

CURRENT SIZE: U.S. and coalition officials estimate that JTJ currently has between 400 and 1,000 members. The cell-based structure of the group and the fluid nature of alliances among foreign fighter groups in Iraq make it difficult to determine the group's strength.

HISTORY: The Jama'at al-Tawhid w'al-Jihad (Unity and Jihad Group), made up primarily of non-Iraqi Arabs, was created in Iraq probably during the late summer of 2003. Founder Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi has created a cell-based structure for the group, with independent cells operating in cities across central and northern Iraq, including Mosul, Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi. JTJ's original goal in 2003 was to try to cause the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq to fail, while creating the conditions for the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic government. With the late June 2004 transfer of power, JTJ's current goals are to try to destroy the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) through assassinations of key officials and attacks on government infrastructure. At the same time, JTJ is seeking to drive both allied countries and logistical contracting companies out of the coalition through attacks on coalition convoys and by taking hostages in order to force both away from the U.S.-led effort.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Despite Zarqawi's long history of close links to al Qaeda, he has developed his own independent network in Iraq, where al Qaeda has not yet been able to build a significant presence. Zarqawi met with al Qaeda facilitator Hasan Ghul in January and passed him a letter to be given to bin Laden that laid out his plans for Iraq. He indicated in the letter, which was found when Ghul was captured trying to leave Iraq, that his group would try to disrupt the coalition and try to foment a civil

war in Iraq by attacking Shia targets to such a degree that they would begin attacking Iraqi Sunnis in response. Zarqawi asked for bin Laden's blessing, but he implied that bin Laden's consent was not necessary for him to continue his operations.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: After the fall of the Taliban, Zarqawi fled Afghanistan and made his way to the Middle East. He was in Baghdad in the spring of 2002 and organized a regional network to help develop and distribute toxins that were being developed at camps of Kurdish terrorist ally Ansar al-Islam (AI) in northeastern Iraq. Although the network appeared to have failed to produce a significant amount of toxins to be used in operations, Zarqawi had a wide network of contacts in Europe and the Caucasus with whom he was in contact during that period. In October 2002, while possibly based at an AI camp, Zarqawi directed the assassination of USAID officer Lawrence Foley in Jordan. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Ansar al-Islam's camps were destroyed and Zarqawi went into hiding until August 2003, when JTJ likely was formed. JTJ is able to draw on jihadist volunteers and donors from across the Middle East, and it has used a network of facilitators to move recruits and money into Iraq, most prominently via Syria and Iran.

In August, suicide car bombs exploded at the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad and at the Shrine of the Imam Ali mosque in An Najaf, leaving eighty-two dead, including leading Shia cleric Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim. Also in August, a suicide truck bomb attacked the UN headquarters in Baghdad. The UN secretary-general's special envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello was killed along with twenty-four others, leading to the UN's withdrawal from Iraq. In September, a suicide car bomb was stopped at the entrance to UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing only the driver of the car. In October, Zarqawi's network carried out suicide car bomb attacks against the Baghdad Hotel, which was housing Westerners, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in Baghdad, killing thirty-five. In November, a suicide truck bomb attacked Italian military police headquarters in Nasariyah, killing twenty-nine.

Starting in October and continuing to the present day, suicide car bombs have targeted Iraqi police stations and recruiting centers as well as coalition targets. In March 2004, four suicide bombers attacked Shia pilgrims and worshipers in Baghdad and Karbala during the Shia holy festival

of Ashura, leaving 143 dead and over 400 wounded. The Basra port oil facility was targeted in late April in JTJ's first naval attack. In May, a suicide car bomb killed Iraqi Governing Council president Ezzedine Salim. Also in May, U.S. contractor Nicholas Berg was executed, probably by Zarqawi himself, and the incident was used for media value. This led to a string of hostage takings and executions by JTJ and Iraqi insurgent groups, including the execution of South Korean Kim Sun-Il by JTJ in June. In mid-August, JTJ posted on the Internet the execution of Egyptian Mohammed Fawzi Abdaal Mutwalli, who the group alleged had been working for the coalition as a spy. JTJ has also used its propaganda Internet sites to post several death threats against IIG prime minister Ayad Allawi.

JTJ also attempted to carry out an attack against the government of Jordan, for which Zarqawi has a deep enmity. Arrests of JTJ operatives in March and April in several locations across Jordan revealed a plot to bomb the headquarters of Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate, using probably a large improvised chemical weapon. JTJ later released an audiotape, probably by Zarqawi, in which he confirmed the target of the foiled attack and said to expect more attacks in the region. Zarqawi now has a robust network in Iraq with multiple semi-autonomous cells able to pick the target and timing of attacks. JTJ's total manpower has probably increased in 2004 as a result of Zarqawi's rising international prominence, which has likely resulted in smaller foreign extremist and Iraqi groups merging with JTJ. These additions would supplement the group's influx of recruits entering Iraq from the Persian Gulf. JTJ has not yet been designated a foreign terrorist organization.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: JTJ will likely continue to attack coalition and IIG targets for the foreseeable future. With the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Fallujah, JTJ now has a safe haven within Iraq from which it can operate freely. It appears that JTJ would continue to function in the short term if Zarqawi were captured or killed. However, the loss of his propaganda and leadership value could cause the group to fracture due to loss of support and internal struggles. Similarly, Iraqi insurgent groups may attempt to push JTJ, composed of foreigners, out of Iraq. For now, JTJ rivals al Qaeda as the most prominent terrorist group operating in the Middle East. Given Zarqawi's past experience developing toxins at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, recent indications that the group is attempting to produce crude toxins are cause for concern.

ANSAR AL-ISLAM (AI)

GROUP LEADER(S): Abu 'Abdallah al-Shafi'i currently leads Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam). Prior group leader Najm Faraj Ahmad, a.k.a. Mullah Krekar, who has held refugee status in Norway since 1991, had served as a key propagandist and fund-raiser among Europe's minority Kurdish population during the 1990s. He was arrested in Iran in September 2002, and after being flown to the Netherlands and briefly detained, he returned to Norway. Krekar has been arrested several times for extremist comments calling for attacks in Iraq and against America but is currently out of jail and under surveillance. Hemin Benishari has been named as AI's expert in assassinations and military tactics. He escaped into Iran in the spring of 2003 and his current whereabouts are unknown. Aso Hawleri was third in command of the group until his arrest by coalition forces in Mosul in October 2003. Ayoub Afghani, AI's senior explosives expert, was captured in Baghdad in March 2004.

CURRENT SIZE: Prior to the start of the war in Iraq, AI may have had upward of 2,000 fighters, including a number of al Qaeda members. Following losses at the start of the war and a number of arrests, deaths, and desertions since, the group is believed to currently field between 500 and 1,000 Iraqi Kurdish fighters, with many operating in cells in cities across central and northern Iraq.

HISTORY: Ansar al-Islam formed in late 2001 in a merger between the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), led by Mullah Krekar, and the al Qaeda-affiliated Kurdish group Jund al-Islam, led by Abu 'Abdallah al-Shafi'i. Originally based in northeastern Iraq and made up almost exclusively of Sunni Iraqi Kurds, the group's goals prior to the war in Iraq were to create a fundamentalist Islamic state in the autonomous Kurdish zone that existed during Saddam's rule. AI controlled about a dozen villages and has fought for additional territory with two rival secular Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and to a lesser extent, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Mullah Krekar approved the use of AI camp facilities by al Qaeda and Zarqawi's network to work on toxins development in 2002 in exchange for al Qaeda funding. AI official Abu 'Abdallah al-Shafi'i took command of the group in late 2003 as AI was setting up cells to conduct operations against coalition forces in Iraq and it became apparent that Mullah Krekar was not going to return to Iraq.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Al Qaeda likely provided AI with a large amount of funding that allowed it to successfully operate from its enclave from 2001 to early 2003. Extremists who would later join AI trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and al Qaeda was likely more than happy to help fund AI following the loss of its Afghan safe haven in 2001. Al Qaeda's toxins program was operational at two AI bases from early 2002 until March 2003, overseen by Zarqawi and his associates. From his AI safe haven, Zarqawi directed the activities of other elements of his regional network. In 2004, al Qaeda has come under increasing pressure, and JTJ is carrying out the majority of anti-coalition attacks in Iraq. With no significant attacks since February, AI appears to be struggling to remain a major player in Iraq. Similarly, it is unclear how strong current contact is between AI and al Qaeda.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Throughout 2002, AI provided safe haven to a group of al Qaeda members while simultaneously conducting military operations against rival PUK forces. The group failed in an assassination attempt against PUK Kurdistan Regional Government prime minister Saleh in April 2002. Following the start of the war in Iraq, most of AI's infrastructure and military capabilities was destroyed in April by air strikes, and some members were killed or captured. A significant number escaped into Iran, where group leaders are rumored to have received aid from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). After reconstituting its strength, most of AI's forces have since returned to Iraq. AI's first attack after the war in Iraq was in late November, when a suicide car bomb attack on the headquarters of the KDP office in Kirkuk killed five people. AI conducted another suicide car bomb attack on the Kurdish Interior Ministry building in Irbil in late December, killing five and wounding 101. In AI's most destructive attack, two suicide bombers attacked a joint KDP and PUK party office during a political meeting in early February 2004, killing 109 and wounding 235. These attacks were listed prominently when AI was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in March 2004. Over the same time frame, AI has lost some prestige and possibly some membership to Zarqawi's JTJ as a result of the low number of attacks it has conducted. AI fighters have been identified operating in Fallujah and other central Iraqi cities in conjunction with JTJ.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: AI has become less effective than Zarqawi's JTJ through an apparent loss of resources and manpower

and has conducted far fewer attacks over the past year. The group, in its current cell-based structure, will likely continue to conduct attacks on coalition forces and on KDP and PUK opponents in northern Iraq as well. With the very low probability that AI will be able to reestablish its northeastern Iraqi sanctuary as long as coalition forces remain in Iraq, AI's short-term goal, similar to JTJ, is to try to disrupt IIG and coalition efforts to unify Iraq. AI continues to hold very similar ideological and strategic goals as al Qaeda and may be able to tap into contacts in Europe's significant Kurdish population to establish cells and carry out attacks in Europe. It is also unclear how close group leaders remain to radical elements in Iran. If the links are significant, Iranian elements may try to use AI as a proxy force to conduct attacks against coalition forces in Iraq if necessary. The same radical elements could use AI to try to conduct attacks inside the United States if Iran becomes actively engaged in the war on terror.

ASBAT AL-ANSAR

GROUP LEADER(S): Asbat al-Ansar (League of the Followers) was founded by Shaykh Hicham el-Shreidi, a fighter in the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s. In 1991, Shreidi was assassinated on the orders of Amin Kayid, the commander of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement in the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp. Abu Muhjin has replaced him as the group's leader and has been responsible for shaping the group's current agenda. He has been sentenced to death in absentia in Lebanon for his role in the 1994 assassination of Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi, the leader of Al Ashbashi (The Ethiopian Organization). Despite this, Abu Muhjin remains at large and has directed assassinations against members of rival Palestinian groups operating in the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, including members of Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement.

CURRENT SIZE: The group has approximately 300 members. Membership is almost entirely made up of Palestinians, and most of its members are based inside the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

HISTORY: Formed in 1985 as a faction in the Lebanese civil war, the radical Sunni group is made up primarily of Palestinians and advocates Salafism, a return to the ancient caliphate system of government. Asbat

al-Ansar has had two political goals since its creation: the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Lebanon, and the prevention of any lasting peace between the Arab states and Israel. Despite this, Asbat al-Ansar has had a mostly ineffectual history of attacks. Attacks since the 1990s have involved low-level bombings of “un-Islamic” targets such as casinos and churches. Asbat al-Ansar has also targeted secular Palestinian groups in the Ayn al-Hilwah camp to increase its own influence. The group was responsible for an explosion at Lebanon’s Customs Department and a 1999 attack on a Sidon, Lebanon, courthouse in which four judges were killed. In Asbat al-Ansar’s first attack on a non-Arab target and its most significant attack to date, a rocket-propelled grenade attack by member Abu Kharab against the Russian Embassy in Beirut in January 2000 resulted in his death and eight Lebanese police casualties. The next week, Lebanese police disrupted an attempt by four suspected members of the group, disguised as soldiers, to launch another attack on the Russian Embassy. Asbat al-Ansar members participated in the jihads in Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, and Afghanistan during the 1990s and returned to Lebanon with greater combat experience and international jihadi contacts, including with al Qaeda. Asbat al-Ansar has likely been receiving al Qaeda funds since the late 1990s and has become even more stridently anti-Western in its rhetoric since.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: On September 25, 2001, Asbat al-Ansar released a statement that it was not allied with al Qaeda, while still praising bin Laden and his cause. In fact, the two have developed increasingly close ties since the late 1990s, with some Asbat al-Ansar members having gone to Afghanistan to attend al Qaeda training camps. After the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, al Qaeda members are suspected of having sought refuge in Ayn al-Hilwah with Asbat al-Ansar. The group’s al Qaeda links were significantly cited when it was listed among eleven groups whose assets were frozen by President Bush by executive order on September 23, 2001. The group’s al Qaeda links were also prominently noted when the U.S. State Department designated Asbat al-Ansar as a foreign terrorist organization in March 2002.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Although Asbat al-Ansar has conducted several low-level attacks since 9/11, the group has not managed to carry out a large-scale attack to date. In October 2001, Lebanese and Jordanian authorities disrupted an Asbat al-Ansar plot to attack the

U.S., Jordanian, and British embassies in Beirut. Since then, the group has returned to its more common practice of attacking “un-Islamic” targets. In 2002, Asbat al-Ansar was believed to have carried out the bombings of three Western fast-food restaurants. The group was involved in a foiled assassination plot against the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Vincent Battle, while he was visiting Tripoli in January 2003, that would have involved firing an armor-piercing missile at the ambassador’s car. Similarly, Asbat al-Ansar associates were involved in an April 2003 failed car bomb attack against a McDonald’s restaurant in a suburb of Beirut and a June rocket attack against the Future TV building in Beirut later that year. Additionally, some Asbat al-Ansar members are suspected of traveling to Iraq to fight the U.S.-led coalition, possibly with the help of al Qaeda associate Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Prior to the start of the war in Iraq, Zarqawi is also suspected of having traveled to the Ayn al-Hilwah camp to establish contacts for future joint operations.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: Although Asbat al-Ansar has not yet successfully conducted a major anti-U.S. or anti-Western attack, group members have the intent to do so as well as access to explosives and weaponry. The group has had a rather ineffectual terrorist track record compared to other Sunni extremist groups, but the fact that Asbat al-Ansar continues to maintain links to al Qaeda and Zarqawi make it more likely that access to this expertise will increase the group’s capabilities and the potential lethality of its attacks.

NORTH AFRICAN ISLAMIC EXTREMIST NETWORK IN EUROPE

GROUP LEADER(S): None

CURRENT SIZE: Unknown

HISTORY: North Africans, and predominantly Moroccans and Algerians, make up a significant portion of the Muslim population in most of the countries in western and southern Europe. Morocco and Algeria are also a main center of the Takfiri Sunni ideology, in which all non-Muslims as well as Shia Muslims are considered apostates and it is considered the duty of all true Muslims to participate in jihad against

them. Takfiri extremists with experience in the Bosnian or Chechen jihads of the 1990s, including members of Morocco's Salafiya Jihadiya, are able to recruit from among western and southern Europe's population of unemployed or low-income Muslim youth who feel disenchanting with European society and its latent anti-immigrant sentiments. Members of the missionary group Takfir wa al-Hijra and Jamaat al-Tabligh conduct similar activities to radicalize moderate Muslims. Al Qaeda at times has also been able to tap into this same vulnerable Muslim population.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Some extremist cells disrupted in Europe have had clear al Qaeda links, while others, such as the Madrid bombers, appear to have formed the attack plots on their own. The core group of al Qaeda's 9/11 attack cell was based in Germany. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi has maintained links to North African contacts in Europe as well, and some North African extremists maintain links to associates in Chechnya.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Some North African extremists in Europe have been involved in several foiled plots in several countries, while others have provided logistical support for extremists elsewhere in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In April 2002, German authorities arrested nine members of al-Tawhid, a Zarqawi-founded group committed to killing Jews and establishing an Islamic state in Jordan, for their activities as a support cell for extremists operating against coalition forces in Afghanistan. In September, Dutch authorities arrested twelve North Africans who were recruiting young Muslims and providing them with stolen or forged passports to send them to jihad in an unknown country. In November, six North Africans were arrested in London for planning to conduct a possible cyanide gas attack, probably against the London subway system. U.K. authorities noted that at the time of arrest, no gas or hazardous material was found and the attack was likely in its early planning stages.

During the period December 24–27, 2002, a series of nine arrests in France uncovered a plot by North African extremists to bomb the Russian Embassy in Paris on behalf of Chechen associates. In January 2003, eight men were arrested in London, disrupting a plot to conduct a ricin attack in the United Kingdom. Spain subsequently arrested sixteen North Africans who had suspicious materials that were likely related to the ricin plot in the United Kingdom. In late January, Italian authorities

disrupted an apparent plot by North Africans to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base in Verona, Italy. In a major successful attack, Moroccan extremist members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), with assistance from a cell of the Moroccan-based Salafiya Jihadiya, detonated time bombs on four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, in early March 2004, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,900. In late March, British authorities arrested eight men with links to the radical group al-Muhajiroun, who had half a ton of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and possibly planned to detonate it in combination with highly toxic osmium tetroxide against unknown targets. On June 9, Italian officials arrested Egyptian extremist and Madrid train attack mastermind Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed. His arrest led French officials to arrest on June 15 twelve North Africans who were possibly planning to bomb the Paris subway system.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: The disaffected North African Muslim population in Europe will remain vulnerable to recruitment to extremist causes for the foreseeable future. There does not appear to be any indication of a near-term change in the anti-immigrant biases and protectionist government policies of the majority of most Western European countries. The true danger of these cells is that they can form quickly and conduct relatively inexpensive attacks without the need to travel and attend terrorist training camps outside of Europe. This will continue to make it difficult for European intelligence agencies to identify the cells in their early stages. The availability of bomb-building manuals on the Internet also makes it increasingly easy for members of these small cells to prepare mass casualty attacks.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

CHECHEN EXTREMISTS

The three most prominent Chechen extremists groups are: the Islamic International Brigade (IIB); Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (also known as Riyadus-as-Saliheen, or RAS); and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).

GROUP LEADER(S): The U.S. State Department maintains that Shamil Basayev is the head of IIB, RAS, and SPIR. Basayev is also thought to lead several other extremists groups in the Caucasus: the Battalion of Kamikaze Shahid, the Congress of Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan, and the United Force of Caucasian Mujahideen. Aslan Maskhadov, former Chechen president and general, is believed to maintain a role in several Chechen extremists groups. Other important leaders include Doku Umarov (field commander), and Khamzat (a SPIR commander). Saudi extremist Abdel Aziz al-Gamdi, a.k.a. Abu Walid, the leader of the IIB and likely head of foreign extremists in Chechnya, was killed in a Russian air strike in mid-April 2004.

CURRENT SIZE: Exact numbers are not known, but RAS is reputed to have approximately 200 fighters and SPIR about 400 active fighters. Many of the fighters mix between the three main groups, so approximating their total strength is difficult.

HISTORY: Russia has waged two long wars against Chechen separatists in the past ten years. The first lasted from 1994 to 1996 and left the region in de facto independent status. In 1999, Chechen rebels launched incursions and bombings in neighboring regions, such as Dagestan, and carried out a series of bombings against apartment buildings in Moscow that killed over 300 people. Russia sent a large military force into Chechnya and has been battling the separatists and their terrorist allies in Chechnya since.

Russia has managed to control Chechnya's northern flatlands but has been unable to control the capital, Grozny, or the southern regions of Chechnya. Most of the war has consisted of guerrilla style, hit-and-run attacks by Chechen forces, and Russian forces have typically retaliated with artillery and air strikes. Chechen groups have also relied on suicide bombings and hostage takings for ransom. Chechens have become notorious for using brutal attacks against soft targets, including deploying suicide bombers on commuter trains and planting explosives on tracks near crowded train stations. Chechen militants are also the only known terrorist group to have used a radiological device. In 1995, rebels planted a radiological bomb in a Moscow park but notified reporters and never detonated the device.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: The U.S. State Department claims that IIB, RAS, and SPIR are associated with bin Laden and al Qaeda and designated them as terrorist groups in February 2003 by executive order. Russian

president Vladimir Putin contends that Chechen rebels work in close coordination with al Qaeda and receive support from non-Chechen Islamic extremists. A former Chechen rebel leader, Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem (alias Ibn-ul-Khattab), who was killed by Russian security forces with a poisoned letter in 2002, worked with Basayev to secure weapons, money, and fighters from bin Laden in October 1999. Khattab, a Saudi-born militant, and bin Laden shared the goal of creating one Islamic state in the Caucasus. Beginning as early as 1995, Chechen rebels received training in Afghanistan, indoctrination through Wahhabist schools throughout Chechnya, and millions of dollars in aid. Some experts maintain that the Chechen guerrillas' contacts with Islamist terrorists altered their cause from one of national independence to one of anti-Western holy war.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Chechen rebels have conducted increasingly lethal attacks since 1999. According to Russian officials, the number of terrorist acts between 1999 and 2002 increased from 100 to 272. Almost all of the attacks since 2001 have been conducted using suicide bombers. In late October 2002, forty Chechen militants seized the Dubroyka Theater in Moscow and took 800 hostages. The IIB, RAS, and SPIR worked together to stage the theater attack by sharing fighters, weapons, and tactics. Chechen extremists attacked the headquarters of the Russian-backed Chechen government in Grozny in late December 2002 using a suicide truck bomb, killing eighty people. In mid-May 2003, an unsuccessful assassination attempt with a suicide bomber against pro-Russian Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov at a religious festival in Chechnya resulted in eighteen dead and 145 wounded. In early July, two female suicide bombers attacked a music concert at Tushino airfield in Moscow, killing sixteen people. In early August, a suicide car bomber attacked a Russian military hospital in Mozdok, Russia, killing fifty and wounding seventy-seven. In September and December, commuter trains in southern Russia carrying mostly students were bombed, killing dozens. In December 2003, Chechen militants began a major guerrilla campaign in the Russian internal Republic of Ingushetia.

In January 2004, Western intelligence services alleged that Chechens had been carrying out chemical weapons experiments in Chechnya. One man arrested in France, on suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack, was alleged to have received chemical weapons training in Georgia's Pankisi

Gorge, a notorious safe haven for Chechen extremists. In early February, bombs placed in Moscow's subway system killed forty-two people and wounded over 100. In early May 2004, Chechen militants assassinated Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov and killed twenty-three others. In June 2004, 200 well-armed rebels raided three towns in Ingushetia and targeted the Interior Ministry building of the province, killing ninety-five people. Basayev has allegedly planned to attack more towns in Dagestan in a similar fashion to the Ingushetia attacks. Chechen extremists staged nineteen attacks against Russian military bases and checkpoints in early August. In mid-August, a Chechen suicide bomber failed in an assassination attempt against acting Chechen president Sergei Abramov. On September 1, 2004, Chechen militants stormed a school in North Ossetia in southern Russia, taking 1,200 adults and children captive. It ended two days later with the deaths of at least 339 hostages, about half of them children. Although Maskhadov denies his connection to the massacre, Basayev proudly claimed responsibility for the raid and Russian officials claim that Maskhadov also played a role in the atrocity.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: Chechen rebels have made two startling tactical shifts in the past two years. First, militants have shown an increased willingness to conduct "maximum casualty" attacks using suicide bombers against hard and soft targets. Second, rebels have opened up a new front against Russia in the republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia, which are mostly Muslim and full of Chechen refugees, and the group's latest maneuvers have taken the Russian military by surprise. Aslan Maskhadov announced on July 6, 2004, that he had enough guerrillas and firepower to fight Russian forces for the next twenty years and that he intended to assassinate whoever next assumed the Chechen presidency. He also stated that Chechen guerrillas would expand terror attacks further outside of Chechnya, likely with the use of suicide bombers.

HIZB-I ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG)

GROUP LEADER(S): Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is the founding leader of HIG. He is on the U.S. State Department's list of global terrorists and one of the FBI's "most wanted" terrorists. There is a \$25-million bounty for Hikmatyar's capture.

CURRENT SIZE: Hikmatyar is suspected of having several hundred veteran fighters on call in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the size of HIG is unknown.

HISTORY: Hikmatyar founded HIG in 1977 as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami Party, a fundamentalist Sunni group and a key mujahideen group in the Soviet-Afghan war. During the war, he became renowned for his brutal tactics, and when the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, he continued to fight other warlords for control of Kabul. HIG continued its rocket attacks on Kabul until March 1993, at which point Hikmatyar struck a deal with former enemy warlords and was named prime minister of Afghanistan. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and began to send mercenary forces to other Islamic conflicts. HIG established deep ties to bin Laden, and Hikmatyar offered safe haven to bin Laden when he fled Sudan in 1996. In late 1996, the Taliban took power in Kabul, ousting the Rabbani government and forcing Hikmatyar to flee the capital.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: The U.S. State Department has declared Hikmatyar a terrorist with ties to al Qaeda and contends that he is responsible for attacks on Afghans and foreigners. HIG has long-established ties to bin Laden, including Hikmatyar's offer of shelter to bin Laden in 1996. In concert with bin Laden, Hikmatyar has declared jihad against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan and has condemned the presidency of Hamid Karzai. A raid in Kabul in April 2004 led to the arrest of eight men who had explosives, weapons, and documents that demonstrated their links to both Hikmatyar and al Qaeda.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, Hikmatyar has coordinated his "holy war" against international forces in Afghanistan with Taliban and al Qaeda forces. HIG forces are suspected of a car bomb attack in Kabul in June 2003, which killed five people, including four German peacekeepers, and wounded thirty-one. In January 2004, Canadian soldiers raided a compound in Kabul, seizing weapons, drugs, and cash along with members of HIG. Hikmatyar is alleged to have plotted to assassinate the Afghan education minister, Yunus Qanooni, and the defense minister, Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim. He has also plotted to attack the American and NATO military headquarters. In March 2004, HIG forces

were reported to have been involved in attacks on three U.S. military bases in southeastern Afghanistan. By July 2004, Hikmatyar had become even more active and is believed to have helped coordinate the regular attacks on police and government posts, nongovernmental organizations, elections workers, and relief workers that occurred in the run-up to the Afghan national election in October 2004. Similarly to al Qaeda and Taliban forces, HIG has benefited financially from the boom in opium trafficking in Afghanistan.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS FOR THE GROUP: In April 2004, Hikmatyar called on fighters everywhere to fight U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan in similar fashion to the insurgents in Iraq. The group's increased cooperation with Taliban and al Qaeda forces and the "fertile" ground for guerrilla activities in Afghanistan seem to have given Hikmatyar and his HIG new life.

LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA (LET)

GROUP LEADER(S): Hafiz Mohammad Saeed leads the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure), an extreme Sunni group based in Pakistan. In December 2001, he officially stepped down as the leader of LeT, likely in response to increased Pakistani pressure, and set up the front group Jamaat ad-Dawa. Although he stated that LeT would now be led by an eleven-member council, Saeed remained the leader of LeT. The group's military operations are led by Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, a Pakistani national who has commanded LeT's terrorist attacks in India since 1995.

CURRENT SIZE: LeT has between 1,000 and 3,000 members, with most based in the Pakistani province of Azad Kashmir and in the city of Muzaffarabad in northern Pakistan.

HISTORY: Founded in 1989, LeT is the militant wing of Markaz Dawa wal Irshad (MDI), a religious organization founded in 1987 that runs a center for Islamic teaching. LeT's goals are to return Indian Kashmir to Muslim control, incorporating it into Pakistani territory. It also advocates the overthrow of non-Muslim governments worldwide, echoing part of al Qaeda's ideology. The group is made up primarily of Pakistanis recruited from madrassas across the country. Although the

group has primarily focused on fighting in Kashmir, the cadre of extremists who would later form LeT began their jihad experience during fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. During that time, group members formed links with what would later become al Qaeda, as well as with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). After the war ended, LeT links to both were maintained. The group began conducting operations in Kashmir beginning in 1993 and with ISID assistance has become one of the three largest and most lethal groups operating in the disputed territory. In Indian Kashmir, LeT has conducted many large mass-casualty attacks and assassinations, attacking Indian civilians in markets, police stations, airports, and border posts. LeT members also conducted a high-profile attack on an Indian army barracks at New Delhi's Red Fort in December 2000, in which three soldiers were killed and all of the attackers escaped. LeT funds its large organization through extensive real estate holdings in Pakistan, contributions from Pakistani sympathizers, and, it is believed, from Middle Eastern donors and al Qaeda.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Having maintained connections with al Qaeda members since the end of the Afghan War, LeT members have likely trained in al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. LeT has probably received some level of funding from bin Laden and likely provided al Qaeda members with safe houses and protection after operatives were forced to flee to Pakistan following the loss of al Qaeda's Afghan safe haven in late 2001. Of note, al Qaeda senior lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was captured at a LeT safe house in Faisalabad in March 2002. Following al Qaeda's dispersal and setbacks, LeT has been noted sending funds to pro-al Qaeda groups such as the Southeast Asian group Jemaah Islamiya. LeT operatives have also reportedly traveled to fight in Iraq, though it is currently unknown whether support for al Qaeda was one of their reasons for being sent. Separately, in June 2003 a federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, charged eleven men for conspiring with LeT to engage in jihadist activity. After four of the men pled guilty to conspiracy and gun charges, the rest were reindicted for conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda and the Taliban.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: LeT has been involved in several high-profile, anti-Indian attacks since the 9/11 attacks. In mid-December 2001, a joint group probably comprising LeT and separatist

group Jaish-e-Mohammed members attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. Although the attackers were all killed and did not succeed in killing any parliamentarians, the attack showed the brazen nature of LeT attacks and led to increased Indo-Pakistani tensions. LeT was subsequently banned by Pakistan in January 2002, and all Kashmiri terrorist groups lost almost all of their ISID assistance. LeT has also been banned in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the EU as well. President Bush designated LeT as a foreign terrorist organization in October 2001. In response, LeT renamed itself Jamaat ad-Dawa (Party of Preachers), though the group's membership and goals were unchanged. LeT leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed also officially resigned as head of the group, but he still appears to run it from behind the scenes. LeT, along with other Kashmiri extremist groups, claimed responsibility for the killing of Kashmir law minister Mushtaq Ahmed Lone on September 11, 2002. Though it did not claim responsibility, Indian authorities believe that LeT was behind two timer-detonated car bomb attacks in the commercial district of Mumbai, India, near U.S. Consulate Mumbai in late August 2003 that killed fifty-two people and wounded 153. If LeT is responsible, this would represent the first use of car bombs by the group and would increase the lethality of attack options open to it for future operations.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: LeT leaders have been careful to maintain that their goals are focused on the ejection of India from Indian Kashmir, but the group's actions, especially after 9/11, are becoming increasingly supportive of al Qaeda. It is likely that the group will continue to carry out the majority of its attacks in Kashmir, but it may conduct more activities to support al Qaeda as the harassed al Qaeda network leans more heavily on it for logistics and aid.

LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LeJ)

GROUP LEADER(S): Muhammad Ajmal, a.k.a. Akram Lahori, is thought to be the radical Wahhabi Sunni group LeJ's current leader, though he is in Pakistani custody. Lahori and Riaz Basra were the group's co-founders, though Pakistani forces killed Basra in May 2002 and Lahori was captured in Karachi in June 2002 and was sentenced to death in April 2003. Senior LeJ member Qari Ataur Rahman, a.k.a. Naeem Bukhari, who was allegedly involved in the murder of Daniel Pearl, was

also arrested in Karachi in 2002. Almost all of the group's leaders are veterans of the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

CURRENT SIZE: LeJ has a current strength of approximately 100 operatives. LeJ once had a much larger membership and sent operatives to fight with the Taliban regime against the Northern Alliance. Crackdowns by successive Pakistani governments have reduced the group's strength.

HISTORY: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was founded in 1996 in Pakistan as a splinter group of the Wahhabi sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which it said was not extreme enough. The group is named after SSP co-founder Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, who was killed in 1990. Both groups have been responsible for attacks on Shia targets in Pakistan, and LeJ has also been involved in anti-Western attacks in Pakistan and anti-Indian attacks in Kashmir. LeJ's goals are to overthrow the current Pakistani government in favor of a radical Sunni Islamic government and to create sectarian strife toward that end by targeting Pakistan's minority Shia community. The group is also virulently anti-Western. Press reports indicate that LeJ is organized in a loosely coordinated cell structure based primarily in the Punjab and several cities, including Faisalabad, Peshawar, and Karachi. A LeJ cell in Lahore conducted a failed assassination attempt in January 1999 against former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother, the chief minister of Punjab Province. A bomb that had been placed under a bridge his convoy would cross went off prematurely, killing three people.

LeJ's leadership was close to the Taliban regime, which offered group members sanctuary in Afghanistan, even after President Pervez Musharraf officially banned LeJ in August 2001 and demanded that the Taliban hand over any group members in its territory. Leading up to the September 11 attacks, LeJ operatives also established strong relationships with al Qaeda members in Afghanistan. Like al Qaeda, LeJ likely receives funding from Saudi Wahhabi donors in the Middle East and may receive funding from al Qaeda as well.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Following the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, LeJ operatives actively assisted al Qaeda members fleeing into Pakistan with safe houses and logistics. LeJ actively began to work on al Qaeda's behalf soon after. The two collaborated in the murder of Daniel Pearl, and al Qaeda apparently provided funds for LeJ to carry out the mid-

2002 attacks on French military contractors in Karachi and Consulate Karachi. LeJ's close links and assistance to al Qaeda were listed as central reasons it was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in January 2003.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: LeJ has carried out several anti-Western attacks, as well as mass-casualty attacks against Shia targets since the September 11 attacks. In October 2001, LeJ members attacked a Church of Pakistan service in Rahawalpur that resulted in sixteen Protestant dead. In March 2002, LeJ members conducted a grenade attack on a Protestant church in Islamabad. The attack resulted in five dead and forty-six wounded, including two Americans killed and thirteen wounded. LeJ also conducted several car bomb attacks. In May 2002, a suicide car bomber attacked a Pakistani Navy shuttle bus carrying French contractors, killing twelve people, including eleven French, and wounding nineteen, including eleven French. A June 14, 2002, suicide car bomb attack against the U.S. Consulate Karachi resulted in eleven deaths and fifty-one wounded. In a press conference after the attack, Pakistan's interior minister indicated that evidence pointed to LeJ, with al Qaeda assistance, as the perpetrators of both attacks. He also stated that LeJ had a role in the kidnapping and execution of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in late January 2002.

LeJ has also carried out significant attacks against Shia worshipers, including a June 8 attack on a police vehicle in Baluchistan Province that killed twelve Shia police recruits, a July 4, 2003, attack against Shia worshipers at a mosque in Quetta, which resulted in fifty-three dead and sixty-five wounded, and a March 2, 2004, attack on a procession of Shia worshipers in Quetta, in which attackers used machine guns and grenades to kill fifty-one and wound 154. In June 2004, Dawood Badini, the head of LeJ's Baluchistan Province cell that carried out both attacks, was captured in Karachi, but he has not yet been tried.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: LeJ has become a significant al Qaeda ally in Pakistan. The group, through its various cells, will likely continue to protect al Qaeda members with safe houses and forged travel documents, and it would be willing to carry out more attacks against Western targets on al Qaeda's behalf. Despite the capture of LeJ leader Akram Lahori and Baluchistan Province cell leader Badini, other LeJ cells in the country can continue their activities without any adverse effects

from their arrests. No new overall leader appears to have been chosen while Lahori is in prison.

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU)

GROUP LEADER(S): Tohir Yuldashev is a founder of the IMU and is the group's current leader based in Pakistan. Group cofounder Juma Namangani served as the head of military operations until his death in late 2001.

CURRENT SIZE: The group likely has 300–800 members. The IMU used to have a significantly larger membership of several thousand, primarily based in Afghanistan, and with a presence in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; crackdowns by Central Asian governments and heavy IMU losses incurred during fighting against U.S.-backed Afghan forces in late 2001 has reduced those numbers.

HISTORY: The IMU was cofounded in 1998 by Islamic radicals Juma Namangani, who had Soviet military experience in Afghanistan, and Mullah Tohir Yuldashev. The two men split off from the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Uzbekistan because it was not radical enough for them. The two formed their own group, Adolat (Justice) and called for an Islamic revolution in Uzbekistan. As a result of the subsequent ban on Adolat and the arrest of two dozen group members by President Islam Karimov's government in 1992, Yuldashev and Namangani fled to Tajikistan from Uzbekistan and joined the IRP of Tajikistan. The IMU's goal when it formed in 1998 was to overthrow the secular government of Uzbekistan and replace it with an Islamic state. While Namangani served as the group's military leader, Yuldashev served as a key fund-raiser, traveling to the Middle East and Pakistan during the late 1990s, reportedly becoming closely associated with Pakistan's ISID. Yuldashev also met with Chechen commanders during the first Chechen war of 1994–1996. Namangani fought in the Tajik civil war until it ended in 1997 and then moved his base of operations and fighters into Afghanistan in 1997 after befriending the Taliban.

After the IMU's creation in Kabul under Yuldashev and Namangani's co-leadership, group members received training in camps run by al Qaeda. In February 1999, the IMU set off five remotely detonated car

bombs in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, killing sixteen people. IMU members also crossed from Afghanistan into the Ferghana Valley of southern Uzbekistan to conduct bombings against Uzbek government targets in 1999 and 2000. The IMU also kidnapped several groups of Western tourists during the same time period, though most escaped or were released, at times after a payment of ransom. Due in part to these kidnappings, the IMU was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in September 2000.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Yuldashev and Osama bin Laden have had close ties since the late 1990s. IMU forces fought alongside al Qaeda during fighting in Afghanistan in late 2001. IMU forces appear to have closely integrated themselves with al Qaeda associates in the tribal areas from late 2001 to the present. Further, IMU forces have been heavily engaged in fighting with Pakistani forces conducting operations in the tribal areas in the spring and summer of 2004, and IMU forces have reportedly taken heavy casualties. From details of the fighting, it appears that Arab al Qaeda members have chosen to flee from fighting rather than fight Pakistani forces. It is uncertain whether the IMU members are fighting to protect al Qaeda leaders in the area.

ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS SINCE 9/11: In late 2001, the IMU's Afghan infrastructure and a large number of its members were killed during air strikes and in combat with U.S.-backed Afghan forces during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. After Namangani was killed, Yuldashev and his remaining forces fled across the Pakistani border. They have largely remained in the tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border, sheltering with al Qaeda and Taliban associates based there. The IMU is likely responsible for an attack against a Western Union office in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in early May 2003. Kyrgyz authorities disrupted an IMU plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy and a hotel used by Westerners in Bishkek during the same time frame.

In late March 2004, an accidental explosion at a safe house in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, led police to uncover and disrupt the activities of additional operatives in Bukhara. Other operatives in Tashkent, including several female suicide bombers, subsequently carried out suicide attacks primarily against Uzbek police, while others blew themselves up rather than giving themselves up after Uzbek police surrounded their safe houses and engaged in firefights with those inside. Amid the terrorist

attacks and police assaults on safe houses, nineteen people were killed and twenty-six wounded during fighting on March 28–29; another twenty-three people died and five were wounded on March 30. Both the IMU and a previously unknown group calling itself Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) claimed credit for the attacks. The IJG said in a statement that it carried out the attack because of the secular nature of the Uzbek regime and due to Uzbekistan's support for U.S.-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan. On July 30, three male suicide bombers blew themselves up at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek prosecutor's office in Tashkent. The attacks took place at the same time that trials began for fifteen operatives who had been arrested for the March attacks. Again, both the IMU and the IJG claimed responsibility.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: It remains unclear whether the IJG is a splinter group that separated from the IMU or is instead the IMU using another name to claim credit for the two Uzbek attacks to take pressure off itself. If it is a separate group, it is unclear whether its base is in Uzbekistan or Pakistan. Similarly, if it is responsible, the IJG track record of suicide attacks is likely to continue until key leaders are arrested or killed. Pakistani forces reportedly wounded IMU leader Yuldashev during fighting in the spring of 2004, and it is unclear whether he remains in the tribal areas of Pakistan along the Afghan border or has moved elsewhere. Were Yuldashev to die, there does not appear to be a clear successor to him in the group, and it is unknown whether the IMU would remain intact without him.

JAMAAT AL-TABLIGH (JT)

GROUP LEADER(S): Unknown

CURRENT SIZE: JT (Society for the Propagation of Islam), which is concentrated primarily in Pakistan, has thousands of adherents, some of whom are also in the Middle East, Europe, and North America.

HISTORY: Founded in India in 1927, Jamaat al-Tabligh is one of the largest conservative missionary movements in the world. Slowly spreading from South Asia, JT members can now be found worldwide. The movement is dedicated to the purification of Muslims by returning to the

practices of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. They call for the rejection of the modern world, preaching both in mosques and door-to-door in cities and towns. The movement advocates the segregation of women, is nonviolent, and is staunchly apolitical, refusing to discuss or take a stance on any modern events. Despite this, some in the movement evidently argued that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a perfect form of government. The movement's preachers attempt to recruit Muslim men, especially ones without strong religious beliefs looking for an identity, to travel and preach with them. In the United States, al Falah mosque in Queens, New York City, serves as a center of JT activity and hosted a gathering of 200 Canadian and American JT missionaries in 2003.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: U.S. law enforcement officials have stated that JT teachings adhere to the extreme message of al Qaeda and other Islamic groups. Prior to the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda members also allegedly traveled in the guise of JT preachers, looking for good candidates to recruit from those they meet. Similarly, al Qaeda members have used the cover of traveling for JT as a reason given to receive visas issued and to have old airline tickets reissued. John Walker Lindh traveled with JT missionaries soon after he converted to Islam in 1999. He received assistance from a JT missionary to enroll in a madrassa in Pakistan to study Islam. From there, he traveled to a training camp in Afghanistan. An al Qaeda member, Kamal Derwish, recruited six Yemeni-American men from Lackawanna, New York, to travel to Pakistan in the spring of 2001. He instructed them to use the cover story that they were going to study Islam under JT missionaries. Once they arrived in Pakistan, they traveled on to Afghanistan and attended al Qaeda training camps. They were arrested in Lackawanna after returning to the United States, where they pled guilty to terrorism-related charges.

ACTIVITIES SINCE 9/11: Although no JT members are known to have been involved in any extremist activities, several cases since September 11 involve Islamic extremists in America attempting to use JT to help advance their activities. In late 2001, seven people from Portland, Oregon, tried to travel to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. Most returned after spending time in China, but Jeffrey Battle traveled on to Bangladesh with the intention of finding a JT missionary who could help

him get military training and travel to fight for the Taliban. Islamic convert Iyman Faris, a truck driver who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000, used the cover of being a JT missionary to get old airline tickets reissued in late 2001 that were not originally in his name. When he returned to the United States, he studied attack plans with ultralight aircraft and worked on a plan to cut suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge on behalf of al Qaeda attack planner Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. Faris was arrested in early 2003.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: Although JT will likely continue to be a nonviolent missionary movement, al Qaeda and associated Islamic extremist groups will continue to use it as cover to travel and conduct recruiting and operational activities.

OTHER

HIZB'UT TAHRIR (HT)

GROUP LEADER(S): unknown

CURRENT SIZE: The group has between 10,000 and 100,000 adherents concentrated in twenty-five countries in Central Asia, the Middle East, Australia, North America, and several Central European countries. In the West, it is highly visible in the United Kingdom. A separate leadership structure in Indonesia claims to lead the “official” HT, and differences continue between it and the U.K. leadership, which all HT members in Western countries look to for guidance.

HISTORY: Hizb'ut Tahrir (HT) was founded in 1952 by Palestinian Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani as an offshoot of the militant Muslim Brotherhood. HT advocates the nonviolent overthrow of Muslim regimes that have been corrupted by Western influences. The group's long-term goal is to create an Islamic state that includes all of the Middle East and Central Asia to be ruled by Sharia law. HT focuses entirely on the political issue of changing the governments of “corrupted” Muslim states and has thus been outlawed in Pakistan, Russia, Germany, Turkey, and most countries

in Central Asia. In the United States, the group is concentrated in California. Focused on political change and as a polar opposite of Wahhabist groups, HT does not restrict its members' dress, appeals to all denominations of Islam, and encourages the use of technology to proselytize and expand HT's membership. In Western society, members wear modern clothing. The group operates a significant number of propaganda Web sites designed to augment speaking rallies and media releases in promoting its agenda. Although these efforts are left to overt members of the group, other members work directly in Muslim communities to attempt to draw new members. Membership has increased since the early 1990s as Middle Eastern issues flared and several Central Asian governments, especially Uzbekistan, cracked down on Islamic groups operating in their countries. In recent years, several European governments, including those of Turkey and Germany, have also cracked down on the group and banned HT for its radical statements.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Although links between HT and al Qaeda appear at most to be indirect, Western officials have voiced concern over the similar goals the two share in overthrowing "Western" Muslim governments and establishing a pan-Islamic, Sharia-governed state. Also similar to al Qaeda, HT advocates the use of suicide bombers to attack Israel and has stated that occupying forces in Muslim lands can face the use of force to evict them. HT has not issued threats against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but the threat is implied. Also, HT leaders maintain ties to al-Muhajiroun, an HT splinter group that supported armed, violent action in jihad. Both al Qaeda members Zaccharias Moussaoui and Richard Reid were introduced to al Qaeda through al-Muhajiroun. It is possible that some HT members have similar links to al Qaeda as al-Muhajiroun, but that has not been positively established.

ACTIVITIES SINCE 9/11: HT has not changed its profile following the September 11 attacks. Group members have continued to recruit from among young Muslims and have continued the heavy use of Internet propaganda. Resentment in the Muslim world of perceived heavy-handed U.S. actions in the Global War on Terrorism, including the war in Iraq, have likely expanded the group's recruitment base. The government of Uzbekistan has stated that HT is attempting to overthrow it. Following suicide attacks in Tashkent in March and July 2004, the Uzbek government quickly released statements arguing that HT, with

IMU assistance, was responsible. The group issued statements denying responsibility for the attacks but reiterated calls for the Uzbek government to be replaced.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: HT will likely continue to have a strong following and be able to continue to recruit young Muslims in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. HT's focus on a mixed political and religious agenda will enable it to have a very wide appeal, especially in countries with oppressive governments or in regions where active conflict is occurring, such as the Middle East.

AL-MUHAJIROUN (ALM)

GROUP LEADER(S): Syrian sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed leads al-Muhajiroun (The Immigrants) from its headquarters in the United Kingdom. Bakri is an ex Hizb'ut Tahrir member who advocates attacks on Western countries and against "Westernized" Muslim governments. He has connections to many terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. He is currently a judge in the Court of Sharia U.K. and has issued numerous religious rulings (fatwas) saying that it was allowable to kill former British prime minister John Major and current prime minister Tony Blair, but only while they were traveling in Muslim countries.

CURRENT SIZE: ALM likely has upward of 1,000 members, though the group's cell-based structure makes it difficult to determine the group's actual strength.

HISTORY: Al-Muhajiroun was founded in 1996 by Bakri after he left Hizb'ut Tahrir because of a dispute over the use of violence. ALM advocates the establishment of a pan-Islamic state based on Sharia law but also seeks to establish the rule of Sharia law wherever Muslims are present, even in Western society. The group is heavily based in the United Kingdom but also has a presence in the United States. Most members, who are heavily recruited from among the population of young Muslim men disaffected with Western society in the United Kingdom and United States, wear traditional clothing and beards. Due to the group's violent propaganda and Bakri's extremist contacts, ALM is thought to be a feeder of young recruits for al Qaeda, Hizbullah, and Asbat al-Ansar,

though this has not been proven. It is thought that Bakri provided assistance to U.K.-based Muslims to travel to Afghanistan for training in al Qaeda camps in the 1990s. Bakri has repeatedly stated in his sermons that it is the duty of Muslims to fight and attack those who attack Muslims, and to strike Western countries. Despite this, ALM has not been banned in Britain due to the country's laws protecting free religion. Bakri has claimed that he recruited a suicide operative who attacked Indian soldiers in Kashmir in December 2000. In January 2001, another ALM-linked British citizen conducted another suicide attack against an Indian army barracks.

LINKS TO AL QAEDA: Bakri has a long association with Osama bin Laden. He issued bin Laden's decrees through his media sources in the 1990s and later praised the 9/11 hijackers. Bakri also assisted men traveling to Afghanistan for training and has praised bin Laden's anti-Western agenda.

ACTIVITIES SINCE 9/11: Group members have been involved in a series of plots and attacks in recent years. Two British ALM members were identified as Hamas suicide bombers who attacked a bar in Tel Aviv in April 2003, killing three. In January 2003, U.K. authorities raided apartments around London in connection with arrests that indicated a plot to use ricin in an attack. Several North African suspects arrested in connection with the plot were linked to an ALM Web site. In the spring of 2004, suspects were arrested in London after police seized a warehouse containing 1,200 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer associated with the suspects. Earlier in April, Bakri had issued a statement that a group called al Qaeda Europe would conduct an attack on London soon. The group's Pakistani branch separated from the U.K. headquarters in February 2004, arguing for a more moderate approach to achieve the group's goals.

OUTLOOK AND FUTURE INDICATORS: ALM will likely continue to espouse violent and radical propaganda until key group leaders are arrested and its media outlets are closed. ALM members will likely continue to plan and carry out attacks or to support other groups by providing members and logistical support for attacks. Additionally, ALM members in the United States pose a potential threat to either conduct an attack in the United States or support other groups planning to do so.

