

SECTION I

BACKGROUND

1.1 Task Force Mandate

The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), at its Twenty-Second Meeting held in Nassau, The Bahamas in July 2001, expressed concern over the new forms of crime and violence that continue to pose threats to security, with implications for individual safety and the social and economic well-being of the Region as a whole. It agreed to establish a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (hereafter referred to as the Task Force), to examine the major causes of crime, and to recommend approaches to deal with the problems as outlined in the original Terms of Reference (Box1). The Task Force (was to be) comprised of representatives from each of the Member States, the Regional Security System (RSS), the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), and the regional Secretariats, and chaired by a nominee of the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, who has responsibility for Security in the Quasi Cabinet of the Community.

Mr. Lance Selman was nominated by the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago as Chairman. A bio sketch of Mr. Selman is attached as Annex I to this Report.

Box 1

Terms of Reference of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (July 2001)

The Task Force will:

- (i) Study the range of complex issues with a view to isolating the fundamental causes of the increasing levels of crime, violence and security threats in the Region, taking into account the submission by Antigua and Barbuda, and current national, sub-regional and regional initiatives to address the problems;
- (ii) Develop recommendations for a coordinated response at the sub-regional and/or regional levels which will enable Member States to provide the requisite level of security for their populations and visitors; and
- (iii) Meet as often as possible, to complete its work by 31 December 2001, so that its recommendations can be considered by Ministers responsible for National Security and Attorneys-General in advance of submission to the Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference.

1.2 Participating Countries/Regional Secretariats/Institutions

The Member States and Regional Secretariats/Institutions that participated in the work of the Task Force are listed in alphabetical order –

Member States

- | | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Antigua and Barbuda | 6. Guyana | 11. St Kitts and Nevis |
| 2. Barbados | 7. Haiti | 12. St Vincent and the Grenadines |
| 3. Belize | 8. Jamaica | 13. The British Virgin Islands |
| 4. Dominica | 9. Montserrat | 14. Trinidad and Tobago |
| 5. Grenada | 10. Saint Lucia | |

Regional Secretariats/Institutions

1. Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP)
2. Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC)
3. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)
4. Project Management Office (PMO)
5. Regional Security System (RSS)

Also participating in the work of the Task Force at its invitation were Professor Ramesh Deosaran Director – Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of the West Indies, St Augustine and Dr Anthony Harriott Senior Lecturer, Department of Government, Faculty of Social Sciences University of the West Indies, Mona. The Task Force wishes to record its appreciation for the significant contribution of these gentlemen.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago agreed to fund the Task Force Secretariat and host the Meetings of the Task Force. The Secretariat, established on 15 October 2001, became operational from 1 November 2001 for a period of 3 months. Trinidad and Tobago subsequently agreed to extend its support, to facilitate further work of the Task Force, to July 2002.

1.3 Task Force Methodology

The Task Force held five (5) meetings on the 20-22 November 2001, 2 December 2001, 9-10 January 2002, 12-14 March 2002 and 16-18 May 2002.

The list of participants at these Meetings is contained in **Annex II to this Report**. In addition, six sub-Committees in the following areas expedited the work of the Task Force

- (i) Counter-terrorism;
- (ii) Intelligence and information sharing;
- (iii) Illicit firearms;
- (iv) Crime and violence;

- (v) Regional Authority/Commission for Counter-Narcotic Strategy; and
- (vi) The Impact of Deportees on Crime and Security.

The body of information that formed the basis of the Task Force deliberations and recommendations was derived from:

- (i) Plenary Sessions of the five meetings;
- (ii) Reports from the six Sub-Committees;
- (iii) Submissions from the Regional Secretariats;
- (iv) Country Reports from Member States;
- (v) Contributions from UWI criminologists;
- (vii) Proposals from the ACCP on the establishment of a Regional Rapid Response Unit;
- (viii) Documentation provided by the UNDCP on existing protocols on crime reduction.

It should be noted that constraints of time and resources did not allow for rigorous scientific investigation of many relevant issues. The Task Force recommends that this aspect be included in future work on crime in the Region.

1.4 Expanding the Terms of Reference

The original terms of reference were subsequently amended to take into consideration -

- (i) The policy directives arising out of the special emergency meeting of the Heads of Government in Nassau, 11-12 October 2001, which resulted from the September 11 attack on the USA; and
- (ii) The Caribbean High Level Meeting on Drugs and Crime, which was co-sponsored by CARICOM and UNDCP, and held in Trinidad and Tobago on the 4-5 December 2001.

Box 2

Policy Directives from Special (Emergency) Meeting (October 2001)

The Task Force will focus on the following areas –

- (i) Strengthening the mechanisms to further enhance co-operation and collaboration with agencies outside the Region, in building institutional capacity;
- (ii) Establishment of National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) where these do not currently exist, in order to optimise the activities of National Law Enforcement Agencies;
- (iii) Establishment of a sub-regional intelligence information unit to service the Eastern Caribbean States, taking into account the joint initiatives between CDB and UNDCP;
- (iv) Strengthening regional intelligence information exchange;
- (v) Security measures to protect national borders through greater co-operation among security forces;
- (vi) Common approaches on the issue of deportation from the metropolises to the Caribbean;
- (vii) Enhancement of national security consciousness in civil society;
- (viii) Emphasising strategies for greater self-reliance, a vital element of which is food security; and
- (ix) Long-term strategies for sustainability with LAC to improve information sharing between the Financial Intelligence Units within and outside the Region, and the establishment of a Regional Special Investigating Unit for a coordinated approach to crime investigation.

1.5 Caribbean High Level Meeting on Drugs and Crime

The High Level Meeting focused on the Barbados Plan of Action (1996), and the links between drug abuse, drug trafficking and crime and violence. The Heads of Government, after receiving the report of this meeting, further agreed at its intersessional meeting (February 2002) that the Task Force should address six issues from that meeting.

Box 3

Priorities from the High Level Meeting for Incorporation into Terms of Reference of Regional Task Force Feb. 2002)

Develop a new regional initiative on illegal drugs to include a list of priority items agreed to at the Meeting;
Undertake a comprehensive review of the Regional Bodies, and options;
Promote regional co-operation under the aegis of OAS/CICAD;
Consider the proposal on the sub-regional maritime co-operation;
Develop a co-operation mechanism among law enforcement agencies and private shippers; and
Consider the proposal of the Hon. Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda viz., creation of a regional office for drug control and prevention, establishment of a rapid response unit and construction of regional high security prisons.

1.6 Realities, Vulnerabilities, Threats and Challenges

The geographic spread of the Caribbean Community imposes a challenge to regional security in general, and to the fight against crime linked to illicit arms and drugs in particular. The geographic spread of the countries as illustrated on the map (below), comprises the expanse of land and sea borders. These stretch from The Bahamas in the north to Belize in Central America in the west, through to Barbados, the most easterly island, to Guyana and Suriname (sharing borders with Brazil and Venezuela) in South America. In the Caribbean Sea also, are the French Departments and British protectorates, in close proximity to the Windward and Leeward Islands that make up the OECS, as well as the Dutch Caribbean, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Cuba. Any policy dealing with security must incorporate a strategy for collaboration that encompasses the “PAN” Caribbean, if it is to be sustainable.

The geopolitical reality of the Caribbean greatly influences the proposals for institutional strengthening and capacity building at the regional level. These clearly demonstrate that programmes and policies for crime and security require human, technological and financial support from international partners. In the context of the fight against crime linked to drugs and arms, the wider Caribbean links have particularly engaged the attention of the Task Force.

Caribbean States are vulnerable in many ways. Their economies are open and highly dependent on foreign investment. Their land and sea borders are highly exposed and

easily penetrable. They are susceptible to natural disasters; and their relatively small sizes and limited resources make it difficult for them to compete in the international decision-making fora that involve highly complex regulations and negotiating requirements. Geographical, socio-economic, legal, and security factors contribute to the challenges confronting the Caribbean. Above all, globalisation demands new strategies and new alliances to deal with the threats to security. In this context, the profile of vulnerabilities, challenges and threats in **Box 4**, is the result of a composite of responses from law enforcement and policymakers from Member States and Organisations/Institutions that comprise the Task Force.

Box 4

Challenges leading to Threats

- (i) Limited financial, human and economic resources.
- (ii) Lack of transparency in public affairs.
- (iii) Perceptions of increasingly unacceptable levels of corruption and mis-management in crucial areas in the public sector.
- (iv) Limited resources to respond adequately to new waves of crime.
- (v) Need for greater regional coordination.

Characteristics of Vulnerabilities

- (i) Dispersal of territories and expanse of unmanned borders.
- (ii) External origins and cultural affiliations of crime groups.
- (iii) Differentiation and fragmentation of the Caribbean based on economic and social factors (in some cases, ethnic).
- (iv) Differences in the nature of the economy, the culture, and in relationships between States.
- (v) Openness of externally propelled economies to natural disasters and dependence on tourism.
- (vi) Unemployment and lack of opportunities, particularly among the youth.
- (vii) High debt burdens, e.g. the special case of two (2) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s; Guyana and Haiti; in the Region.
- (viii) Second highest level of HIV/AIDS after sub-Saharan Africa.

Main Elements of the Threat

- (i) White collar crime and corrupt officials.
- (ii) Trafficking in drugs and illegal arms.
- (iii) Heightened public fear and outrage versus new forms of crime.
- (iv) New tensions in the labour movement over impact of globalisation and implications for the job market..
- (v) Transnational crime.
- (vi) Money Laundering.
- (vii) Terrorism.

1.7 Experience in Co-operation

CARICOM States have been engaged in several forms of co-operation over the years, of which functional co-operation in the areas of education and health have been the most successful. The current thrust towards a CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) is another manifestation, made even more urgent by the need to be competitive in the global economy with its emphasis on liberalization. At the same time, the CARICOM Community continues to foster ties with other states in the Caribbean basin.

Through special trade agreements with the Dominican Republic and Cuba; and special co-operation agreements with these two countries and the Dutch and French Caribbean, an example of which is the Pan Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS that is coordinated by the CARICOM Secretariat. It is increasingly the view of the Task Force that the urgency of the crime, drugs, arms and security links/situations requires the type of consolidated partnership such as the one developed for HIV/AIDS.

Box 5

The Pan Caribbean Partnership Against HIV/AIDS

The Pan Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS is a coalition of interests comprising CARICOM Member States and other partnerships with French and Dutch Caribbean States, and specialized national, regional and international Agencies. Their common objective is to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS, based on the implementation of an agreed Regional Strategic Framework and a co-ordinating mechanism, in this case, located in the CARICOM Secretariat. Mobilisation of resources for the implementation of RSF is considered to be an essential value-added to country-specific plans.

International security regulations, particularly those introduced after 11 September 2001, have had an impact on the Caribbean and have affected its tourist industry, with overall implications for the economies of Caribbean countries. Economic vulnerabilities, according to many experts, tend to exacerbate security vulnerabilities, as populations, especially the marginalised, are lured by the prospects of drugs linked to crime.

Collaboration between CARICOM, the Pan Caribbean, USA, UK and Canada, is one way to avoid this trend. This may take the form of short- and medium-term projects pertinent to the needs of the Caribbean and the security of the hemisphere.

1.8 Defining Security and Crime

The Task Force recognises that security threats, concerns and other challenges in the hemispheric context are multidimensional in nature and scope, and that the traditional concepts and approaches must be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional threats, including political, economical, social, health, and environmental aspects. It is noted that this approach was endorsed in the Declaration of Bridgetown on the multidimensional approach to Hemispheric Security.

SECURITY

Given the mandate of the Heads of Government, the Task Force confined itself to a definition of security, which in essence emphasises **governance** and **public safety**. Specifically, the concept referred to a state or condition in which, within the context of a constitutional framework, freedom is enjoyed without fear of victimisation from crime and in which the functioning of governance by a constitutionally elected government is not inhibited or disrupted through criminal activity.

It requires adherence to laws and other regulations and procedures for reinforcement of the laws, and for ensuring that those who execute the laws are also bound by codes of conduct, with rights as well as obligations under the law.

It assumes the existence of a high degree of civility, and the Task Force considered essentially, issues related to public safety while being conscious of the wider concerns with social-economic security related to food, health, education and human rights.

Crime

Crime refers to those acts by individuals, groups and organizations that constitute a breach of the operating rules. It involves the subversion of justice and/or breaking of rules and regulations in several areas – judicial, political, economic, social and individually or collectively.

Principal Security Threats

In the context of this concept, the following were identified as the principal security threats to the Region –

- (i) **Illegal drugs:** it spawns a multiplicity of serious criminal activity and social problems, including the involvement of sometimes innocent and vulnerable members of society, in particular the youth and the poor;
- (ii) **Illegal Firearms:** the primary instrument of violence and the factor principally responsible for generating fear of crime in societies;
- (iii) **Corruption:** the factor most responsible for undermining efforts to address drugs and crime and for the subversion of good governance.
- (iv) **Rising crime against persons and property:** the new forms are largely linked to illegal drugs and arms;
- (v) **Criminal deportees:** a factor of increasing significance in the escalation of crime and violence;
- (vi) **Growing lawlessness:** referring to activities ranging from infractions of the law, to actions falling short of classical crime, but amounting to threatening behaviour, and contributing to fear and affecting the quality of life;
- (vii) **Poverty and inequity:** the large number of persons, especially in inner cities and among youth and linked to unemployment, and social marginalisation that is perceived to be unjust;
- (viii) **Terrorism:** as a priority area for Regional participation in multilateral initiatives against this global threat.

The abovementioned factors, added to the ineffectiveness of the existing criminal justice systems, were considered the principal contributors to the crime problem in the region.

1.9 Methodology linking Crime and Security

For the Caribbean today, guaranteeing public safety cannot be confined to military and police action. The dimensions of criminal activity are increasingly associated with the trafficking of illicit drugs, the increasing use of illegal firearms, the continuous flow of deportees, money laundering, corruption, and other forms of organized crime and terrorism. Such criminal activities combine to disrupt trade and pervert governance, and changes the dynamic of security, as it impacts negatively upon the security and quality of life of CARICOM citizens, causing excessive fear and panic that need to be restrained.

To understand and treat with the phenomenon of rising crime and violence in the Region, the Task Force discussed country reports from Member States and focus was placed on specific threats to peace, where there was considerable concentration on the increase in firearm offences, illegal drugs and on ways and means to deal with the rising tide of crime. The criminologists of the University of the West Indies (UWI) contributed to the discourse with a perspective on the nature and causes of crime, which formed the conceptual basis for further work. At the same time, UNDCP presented a list of existing protocols relevant to efforts at the international level. Together, these provided some yardsticks by which to measure the Caribbean's response to crime in relation to global principles and practices of security.

Due to the lack of time and resources, the Task Force was unable to conduct independent surveys. Consequently, it drew on the country reports for data on crime and violence. Therefore, the information is essentially provisional. The relative lack of standardization of the categories, as well as an absence of universal benchmarks to measure the degrees of crime in the respective categories across countries, make the analysis derived from the data indicative, rather than definitive. The Task Force has made recommendations to address this deficiency.

1.10 Areas of Focus

Against the background of the mandate of the Task Force and the concept of and specific threats to security as earlier outlined, the Task Force essentially focused on the following -

- i. Issues relative to the underlying causes and sources of crime.
- ii. Crime reduction strategies.
- iii. Initiatives against activities posing a direct security threat to the Region.
- iv. Multilateral initiatives against international security, in respect of which the Region is committed to participating as co-victims of transnational crime.

1.10.1 Drug Production and Cultivation

Whereas marijuana is cultivated and produced in the CARICOM Region, cocaine and heroin are produced in the South American Region.

Thus far, marijuana is the only illicit drug in the Region where, notably, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago are among the significant producers for local consumption and export.

Marijuana carries more-value added than other crops in the Caribbean and is becoming more difficult to eradicate as planters are mixing marijuana plants among other legally exported crops.

1.10.2 Consumption and Abuse

In the process of interdiction and arrests in the Region, the drugs that are, on the one hand, being consumed and abused, and on the other, confiscated or eradicated, consist of cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, marijuana and hashish.

Across the CARICOM Region, marijuana stands as the illicit drug of choice, and its demand far outweighs the demand for other illicit drugs. There are also far more males than females consuming and abusing illicit drugs.

It is notable that a scientific study conducted in Jamaica concluded that marijuana is the most commonly used illicit substance among adolescent students¹. There is, however, a small demand for cocaine in most of the CARICOM Region apart from the OECS States. Law Enforcement officials contend that trafficking in cocaine has brought with it an increase in violent crimes, and an increase in other crimes that maintain the consumption habits of drug users. The greatest drug abuse problems in the Region have been reported in parts of the Eastern Caribbean states, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Nonetheless, there have been no significant scientific studies conducted to measure the extent of drug abuse, and the extent to which it impacts crime in the Region.

1.10.3 Trafficking of Illicit Drugs and Firearms

Like elsewhere, illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition is linked to the trafficking in drugs (mainly cocaine, heroin, marijuana and hashish) through the CARICOM Region. The drug trade is linked to firearms, as traffickers use weapons for protecting shipments, intimidating customers or competitors, and executing informants. Dependent drug users tend also to commit crimes to obtain money to fund their drug purchases and may use firearms to perpetrate violent crimes.

Illicit substances are trafficked through the CARICOM Region, where it is dispersed through the islands en route to their final destinations in the major drug demand areas of North America and Europe.

¹ Dr. Ken-Garfield Douglas, *Patterns of Drug Use among Adolescent Students, 1987-1997*, University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, 1998.

These illicit substances are traded for illegal firearms from the US, and foreign exchange. According to the UNDCP, Caribbean Coordination Mechanism (CCM), 80 per cent of the world's cocaine is produced within the Colombian area.

At the level of the State, there is not enough information on the interdiction of drug trafficking, which can give a clear idea of the performance of local Law Enforcement authorities against that of the illicit drug traffickers.

On a regional level, a trend is even less discernible due to the lack of information, coupled with discrepancies in the units of measurement across the CARICOM Member States. For instance, whereas in one constituency, the quantity associated with the eradication of marijuana is measured in hectares, in another it is available in the number of trees or plants.

1.10.4 Money Laundering

Money laundering is the process by which funds traced to illicit activities, including illegal drugs and/or arms, enter the legitimate economy through the banking system. Bank secrecy practices, relative political stability and relatively well-developed telecommunications systems have made the Caribbean vulnerable to money laundering. Whereas the Cayman Islands were once blacklisted as being a “non-cooperative” jurisdiction, they have since turned around their banking policies and are among the leaders in the international fight against money laundering, according to the rankings of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In 2001, the FATF blacklisted as “non-cooperative jurisdictions” several Caribbean countries, including Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines although they are not considered major money laundering countries. Even though the Caribbean Region protested the procedures adopted by the FATF, there were still notable steps taken by countries, for example, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, to freeze any assets linked to terrorist financing.

1.10.5 Calls to Legalize/Decriminalise Marijuana

There have been social movements and public debates to legalize/decriminalize marijuana in Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, for the sake of economic development and growth.

In St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1999, marijuana producers established a formal organization, calling on the Government to desist from cooperating with the United States in the eradication of marijuana fields in the north of the country. Thus, on the heels of the acceptance of marijuana for medical use in California, USA, and the widespread tolerance in other countries, there has been a small but vocal constituency calling for the decriminalisation of its use.

In Jamaica in 2000, the Government established the National Drug Commission on Ganja (NDCG), which, on the one hand, recommended that cannabis be decriminalised for the private, personal use of small quantities by adults, and for its use as a sacrament for religious purposes. On the other hand, the NDCG recommended intensification in the interdiction of large-scale cultivation of cannabis and trafficking of all illegal drugs, in particular, crack cocaine.

The United States expressed its opposition to the decriminalisation of marijuana. In response to this, the NDCG recommended that urgent diplomatic initiatives be undertaken by Jamaica to get support from other countries on decriminalisation.

It is the view of the Task Force that every effort be made to encourage more research on cannabis use and psychotic illness and folk practices, as a guide to the formulation of social policy.

1.10.6 Regional Security - (Overview and Key Conceptual Relationships)

To address the varying issues on crime and security, it is necessary to first have a good understanding of crime and security. A broad view of security has already been associated with public safety (**See 1.8**). There is, however, need to operationalize the parameters of security in relation to crime.

Security in the current circumstances refers to *national security*. However, in cases where it is felt that national security cannot be adequately provided by a state, it may accede to a regional approach to security. In such a case, national security should be informed by regional security.

Naturally, security does not exist in a vacuum. According to convention, the reason for national security is, first of all, to safeguard state sovereignty. Therefore, to come to terms with the demands on national security systems, one has to first explore the various ways in which state sovereignty could be compromised. It is perhaps this pattern that has informed the mandate given to the Task Force by the Heads of Government. For example, money laundering is a challenge to countries, not only because it disturbs the monetary system. The real difficulty relates to the fact that the rights of States and legally constituted bodies to determine monetary policy is obstructed by the practice of laundering – a more than legitimate concern.

Security therefore, has to be viewed as a multifaceted mechanism that focuses on the dealing with the multidimensional threats to legitimate government, which run the gamut from burglary to insider trading.

Crime refers to those acts by individuals, groups and organizations, that constitute a breach of the operating rules.

In this context an examination of the nature and causes, as well as the impact of crime, requires in turn, a recognition that it involves the subversion of justice and/or breaking of rules and regulations in several areas, namely, juridical, political, economic, social, and individually or collectively.

The issue of primary importance, nevertheless, is to determine what are the fundamental causes of the increasing levels of crime, violence and security threats in the Region. The second important activity is how to curb crime. In this regard, crime does not necessarily involve violent behaviour, damage to persons, or even loss of property. Hence, traditional policing activity, whether by sea, land or air does not span the whole range of criminal activity.

There is, therefore, a gap between the issues addressed by traditional policing and those related to the wider issues of spectrum of activity embraced by security. It is, in fact, this gap that Heads of Government may be trying to have delineated. Failing which State sovereignty, which can be compromised, is what will lead to a compromise of legitimate Government. Understanding what gives rise to crime, especially in its new manifestations, is fundamental to preventive strategies and designs of any security system.

SECTION 2

CAUSES AND SOURCES OF CRIME

2.1 Introduction

In the previous section, some of the most important changes in the patterns of crime and criminal offences were described. These changes include increasing violence and gun use. For most countries, homicide rates have been remarkably stable for the last three decades. Additionally, drug-trafficking and drug use emerged as major problems allied with new types of crime such as kidnapping and carjacking. Caribbean societies, it would seem, are becoming more violent and generally more criminogenic.

In this Section, these changes are partially explained. The explanations are limited by an inability to undertake the kind of rigorous empirical investigation that should inform the Report (but which will be done later), and the existing state of knowledge on crime in the Region (which is characterized by very limited empirical work and the existence of very few studies that are truly regional in scope).

The membership of the Task Force on Crime tended to attribute the crime problem to the following factors -

- (i) Poverty;
- (ii) Unemployment; social marginalisation and inequality;
- (iii) The Illegal drug trade;
- (iv) Corruption;
- (v) The trafficking in firearms;
- (vi) The deportation of criminals; and
- (vii) The ineffectiveness of the existing criminal justice systems.

The Task Force is composed of highly experienced security professionals from across the Region, including Commissioners of Police, intelligence analysts, and other competent public sector officials and experts. The factors listed above are largely based on their considerable personal experiences as well as the collective experience of their respective organisations.

These ideas reflect the general intuitive conclusions on the crime problem, and conform to a large measure with conventional wisdom. Traditionally, crime is thought of in terms of motivations, opportunities, guardianship and means. Among the factors accounting for crime that are listed above, are:

- (i) the motivating forces (unemployment, immiseration, relative deprivation, etc);
- (ii) the opportunities (the affluence that is one side of the coin of inequality, etc);

- (iii) poor guardianship (weak and ineffective law enforcement, weak, informal control by disorganized communities and families, etc);
- (iv) the means and facilitators (firearms, corruption).

These factors are developed further, with the exception of the trafficking in arms and the deportation of criminals, which are discussed in subsequent sections of this Report.

2.2 Poverty

The discourse on crime in the Caribbean has been centrally concerned with its association with economic deprivation and various forms of social disadvantage. Although a number of Caribbean countries are classified as MDCs, and in some instances, the per capita income is by the standards of the developing world, poverty levels are also fairly high. It is not unusual to find countries with some 20-30 per cent of their populations living below the established poverty line. It is widely believed that poverty has some impact on crime, at least, some types of crime.

If there are mixed results and controversies regarding the direct impact of poverty and unemployment, it is generally accepted that the impact of immiseration may not be direct. Poverty may impact on crime via a number of mediating variables or factors. It is the presence or absence of these mediating variables that explains why in some settings (for example, rural versus urban, or in different countries) there may be high levels of poverty, yet low crime rates.

Low family income may lead to the separation of some children from the family, or to one or both parents migrating to another country in search of better opportunities. These forced changes may in turn lead to poor supervision of children, and delinquent behaviour that may mature into criminal careers -especially where there are no other support systems such as an ably extended family or community support systems.

Research conducted in the Jamaican environment, where a high proportion of households are female headed, suggests that the absence (usually migration) of a mother tends to have a devastating impact on young boys and is a good predictor of delinquency and youth crime. Where parental contact is reduced to occasional material provision and is characterized by an absence of nurturing and contribution to the emotional development of the child, these cases may become problematic.

Another mediating variable may be access to quality education or the ability to make the best of the opportunities that are available. Poverty levels may, for example, influence the quality of school attended and regularity of school attendance, and thus educational outcomes and life chances. Poor life chances may in turn weaken the commitment to conventional means of acquiring valued social and economic goods.

Poverty levels may also influence the social organization and vulnerability to crime of whole communities. In poor communities, the more successful persons may migrate to higher status neighbourhoods, thereby depriving the young people in these

neighbourhoods of conventional models of success and authority figures. These processes in turn lead to reduced informal social control in these communities, the formation of youth gangs, and perhaps a more general disorganization of the community, and disinvestment in it by citizens and businesses.

In general, social disorganization affects the regulatory/control capabilities of communities, resulting in conditions that are favorable to criminality. Sharp residential segregation may develop where poor individuals reside in poor neighbourhoods.

In conditions of marginalisation, processes of sub-cultural adaptation may develop that serve to further reinforce unconventional behaviour and criminality.

These are not “natural” processes. They may evolve in a context of official neglect or may even be facilitated by poor public policy, poor urban planning and poor enforcement. Countries with low crime rates have largely avoided these processes, that is, the geographic concentration of poverty, poverty-related syndromes and the development of ghettos. Public policy matters.

2.3 Economic Inequality

International research has consistently reported a positive relationship between economic inequality and crime. This relationship does not hold for all types of crime, but is especially true for violent crimes including homicide.

A high level of inequality is usually an indicator of other imbalances and social difficulties in a society. It is usually associated with the presence of large excluded sub-populations, or dislocations associated with the early stages of transition from traditional agricultural economic structures to more modern industrial or service economies. Perhaps, in addition, other social problems give rise to high levels of social violence.

While a number of international studies have reported a positive relationship between inequality and homicide, preliminary empirical work suggests that Jamaica conforms to this general international pattern; but there is no consistent pattern within the Caribbean.

2.4 Drugs

High levels of inequality may indicate differential group accesses to opportunities. Elements of marginalised sub-populations may respond to this by creating alternate opportunities, such as engaging in the production and distribution of illegal drugs. This should not be taken to mean that the drug problem in general is simply a function of inequality, but rather that this factor may influence the development of large drug economies.

Drug trafficking and drug use are associated with significant increases in crime. The former is usually associated with increases in violent crimes, especially murder, and the latter, with various types of petty property crimes. Drug trafficking is itself a crime in need of explanation. It does not explain crime. It may, however, explain increased rates of particular types of crime, and/or important changes in the patterns of crime.

A recent CCM report (2000) estimates that the illegal drug market in the Caribbean generates an estimated income of US\$3.3 billion. This, it states, represents 3.1 per cent of the registered GDP of the Region. Cocaine generates most of this income, as it accounts for some 85 per cent of the drug market in the Region. The report does not state the methodology used in making this and other estimates. It is, therefore, difficult to pass judgement on the soundness of these estimates. But, even making allowance for considerable error, this is a fairly large drug market that must be expected to have a significant impact on social and economic activity in the most affected countries.

The successful transshipment of large quantities of illicit drugs is usually a complex business, requiring international coordination of many activities and transactional arrangements.

Violence or the threat of violence regulates transactions in this market. Ganja growers tend to arm themselves in order to protect their produce, and to ensure that the exporters or middlemen who conduct business with them do not rob them.

Drug trafficking networks use violence, usually lethal violence, or the threat of it, to control their members and to settle conflicts with competitor groups. Control measures may also include kidnapping. In Jamaica, it appears that traffickers, in order to ensure that drug couriers do not steal their drugs, have used kidnapping. A family member of the courier may be held hostage until the drugs are delivered to the determined destination, or may take place after the courier has failed to deliver the drugs.

Of course, once these crimes are introduced, they may be copied for other purposes, as may now be occurring in Trinidad and Tobago. Police services in the most drug-affected countries report that significant proportions of the homicides that they investigate are drug-related. In the case of Jamaica, for example, the official statistics indicate that this proportion is currently 14 per cent, but it has at times been greater than 30 per cent.

Drug income provides the resources to sustain criminal networks. It contributes to the professionalisation of the criminal underworld, that is, to the development of groups of professional criminals whose only source of income is crime, and who are able to engage in criminal activity on a fulltime basis. The drug bosses provide negative models of success as persons who are able to amass great wealth, and are in some settings, able to openly display their wealth and continue their criminal activities with impunity. Their life styles serve to effectively communicate the idea that crime pays. Drug dealing networks may corrupt whole communities via treats for the young and the aged, and various forms of assistance to the poor, thereby fostering attitudes that are more tolerant to criminal activity. Drug income may also be used to corrupt law enforcement and public officials.

2.5 Corruption

Corruption serves to facilitate crime and weaken the institutions that are responsible for public safety.

Where there are weak systems of accountability, high levels of corruption in the public and private sectors, and endemic corruption in law enforcement, there are likely to be serious problems with crime. Corruption may affect crime in various ways, including the following -

- (i) As is the case with the drug “dons”, corrupt public officials serve as models for criminal accumulation.
- (ii) Where it is endemic, as in cases where the bureaucratic, political and economic elites are involved, at times in interconnected ways, others in lower locations in the social hierarchy tend to feel justified in doing likewise. The moral authority of institutional leaderships is undermined, and moral justification for criminality is provided.
- (iii) Corrupt functionaries may provide direct services to criminals.

The CCM report, which was cited earlier, estimates that drug corruption provides Caribbean civil servants with some US\$ 320 million in income annually. This is not an insignificant problem.

It is important to recognize that the crime problem is not just the outcome of deep structural arrangements, but also that public policy, and the active interventions of State institutions are key determinants of the outcomes.

The criminal justice system is primarily responsible for controlling the crime problem. With some exceptions, these systems are regarded as not being sufficiently effective. Where arrest and conviction rates for some crimes are low, it may be argued that this effective waiving of sanctions contributes to the crime rate.

2.6 Interactive Processes

Crime is too complex a phenomenon to be reduced to any single causal factor. Some of the factors discussed above may independently coexist with low crime rates. They may also not show any independent effect on crime rates below certain magnitudes. For example, in certain countries, unemployment may not have any independent effect on crime rates below a certain level.

The impact of a particular factor may vary considerably with the different types of crime. If the researchers and research methodologies employed are not sensitive to these issues, erroneous conclusions may be drawn. Even if the independent effects of these factors are unclear, they may however, precipitate processes that mature into conditions that facilitate high crime rates. These processes usually involve the interaction of a number of factors. It is this interaction of various factors, including the ones discussed above, that often results in the conditions that give rise to high crime rates.

Societies are perhaps most vulnerable to these problematic outcomes during processes of rapid change. Since independence, some Caribbean societies have experienced rapid social change. There has also been considerable urbanization.

The Caribbean reality is that urban areas are more criminogenic than rural areas. Kingston accounts for 26 per cent of Jamaica's population, and over 70 per cent of its violent crime. Similarly, County St. George accounts for some 30 per cent of Trinidad and Tobago's population, but almost 60 per cent of its crime. Moreover, in contrast with the social 'stationariness' of colonial society, the rates of upward social mobility are today quite high. With these changes, the expectations of our people and the pressures to succeed, as measured by the standards of material acquisition, have also increased. In the context of globalization and the cultural diffusion of the values of the more individualistic and consumer oriented countries, the expectations and values of Caribbean populations are increasingly influenced not just by internal developments but also by external influences.

Development usually brings with it the breakup of traditional normative controls (extended family, religious beliefs, and ascribed status). Some Caribbean researchers have argued that in some of the most crime affected countries of the Region, modernization has resulted in strong strivings for upward social mobility, replacing acceptance by the poor of their poverty.

"Rampant individualism" has weakened family and community bonds, and money is becoming the most valued good. These profound changes, in the context of weak institutions, are likely to contribute to increased crime rates.

This period of change and development may present considerable difficulties with crime, but they are challenges that may be successfully met with sound public policy that addresses the crime problem *as a developmental issue*, and not narrowly as a law enforcement issue.

2.7 The Challenges

- (i) To develop innovative strategies and programmes for effective control and to prevent violent crime and the drug problem in the Region, and which are integrated with broader development planning.
- (ii) To strengthen the capacity of the responsible State institutions and regional organisations to respond to the crime problems.
- (iii) To properly fund these efforts and the associated social crime prevention programmes without compromising long-term economic development and other vital developmental goals.
- (iv) To better understand the crime problem, and to develop the level of knowledge of the specifics of the crime phenomenon in the Region, that will better inform public policy.

2.8 Recommendations

- (i) Formation of a research unit that would collaborate with the UWI and other regional institutions, with adequate research capabilities.
- (ii) Take steps to standardise the recording of data on crime within the Region. The UN system could be adopted, as this would better allow for cross-national comparisons. Moreover, it may be willing to assist the Region in this effort.

- (iii) Evaluate the capabilities of the Government departments responsible for urban planning, with a view to improving their capabilities. Special attention should be given to urban slums or potential slums. Jamaica has had considerable experience with this. Such experiences may be useful in helping to avoid these developments in other territories.
- (iv) Increase allocations of funds to drug treatment and education programmes.
- (v) Reinforce anti-corruption measures, including a general strengthening of the systems of accountability.
- (vi) Strengthen and modernize law enforcement and other criminal justice institutions.

These and other measures that follow from this discussion are further elaborated in Section 7 – *Crime Reduction Strategies*.

SECTION 3

ILLEGAL DRUGS

3.1 Introduction

"Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in CARICOM countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of the regional governments more."

These views of the West Indian Commission are as accurate today as they were in 1992 when first stated. There are no quick or easy answers to how best to tackle the continuing worldwide problem of illegal drug production and use. A recent conference in the UK to review drug policies and their impact concluded that "in order to reduce the supply and consumption of illicit drugs and to reduce the negative consequences of drug use and of the policies created to control drugs, some thinking *"outside the box"* is necessary." This conclusion, which is strongly endorsed by the Task Force, is part of the search for appropriate policies to control both supply and demand for illegal drugs and must be driven by good research and quality analysis.

It has been contended that those who advocate tough control policies, which apply downward pressure on the supply of and demand for illicit drugs, especially through improved law enforcement at all stages of the drugs chain, argue that if the 'medicine' is not working, it should be applied in a stronger dose. Others argue, however, that current drug control policies, backed by current UN Conventions, have failed. They propose alternative policies based on tolerance and pragmatism, with the aim of reducing the negative consequences of both drug use and control policies

The Task Force is, however, of the view that there is need for a correct balance between supply reduction and demand reduction. Better integration of international and domestic policies, and enhanced co-operation among law enforcement agencies and non-law enforcement players involved is recommended at all levels. The Task Force noted the arguments in favour of decriminalisation and legalisation, but recognising the level of confusion which currently exists among countries with opposing views, reserved further consideration on the issue until further research and analyses have been undertaken.

3.2 Key Issues

International drug control policies.

International drug policies are based on a three-pronged strategy:

1. Eradication, crop substitution or alternative development for *producer countries* (e.g. South American States);
2. Supply restriction through interdiction operations for *transit countries* (e.g. Caribbean states); and
3. Demand reduction for the *main consumer countries* (e.g. North America and Europe).

This formed the basis of the several international conventions and international co-operation, and has resulted in the EU funded regional maritime co-operation project in the Caribbean and considerable support to the Region's law enforcement agencies.

Regional Responses

Establishment of the IGTF. Cognisant of the enormous threat posed by the illicit trafficking of narcotics in and through the Caribbean, and mindful of the great extra-regional interest in interdicting its flow to mainland North America and Europe, the Conference of Heads of Government saw the need for a coordinated approach, and established an Inter-Governmental Task Force (IGTF) on Drugs. The IGTF was charged with the responsibility of formulating an integrated regional counter-narcotic policy, covering all aspects of the drug trade (production, distribution, consumption and money laundering). The principal elements of this policy would also include the incorporation of relevant initiatives and a regional approach to the conclusion of treaties with third States on counter-narcotic matters.

Establishment of RCM. To support the IGTF, the Conference of Heads of Government agreed to the establishment of a Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the CARICOM Secretariat. The lack of resources to adequately service the IGTF, restricted regional drug control activities to those embodied in the 1996 **Barbados Plan of Action**, the October 1996 Hemispheric Anti-drug Strategy, the 1997 Caribbean/US Bridgetown Plan of Action and the 1999 EU/LAC High Level Co-operation/Coordination Mechanism.

Regional Drug Control Activities. The Regional Drug Control Activities, based on commitments from the various International Conventions and Action Plans have, in the main, focused on the following:

- . *Intelligence/information sharing;*
- . *Criminal law enforcement;*
- . *Customs law enforcement;*
- . *Anti-money-laundering activities;*
- . *Treatment and rehabilitation;*
- . *Education;*
- . *Establishing requisite legislative framework;*
- . *Mutual legal assistance treaties;*
- . *Extradition regimes;*
- . *Maritime co-operation;*
- . *Strengthening of the criminal justice system;*
- . *Improvement of forensic sciences services;*
- . *Drug law enforcement training;*
- . *Precursor chemicals control;*
- . *Regional justice protection;*
- . *National drug councils;*
- . *Regional coordination.*

The Evolution of Regional Drug Coordination. Intra- and inter-regional co-operation in drug control activities saw the evolution of coordination at vertical or specialised level. With initial support from extra-regional sources, several specialised coordinating agencies were established in the Caribbean.

These included the following:

- . *Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP);*
- . *British Military Assistance Team (BMATT);*
- . *Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC);*
- . *Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF);*
- . *Caribbean Epidemiological Centre (CAREC);*
- . *Caribbean Institute of Alcohol/other Drugs (CARIAD);*
- . *Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC);*
- . *Project Management Office (PMO)/Steering Committee;*
- . *Regional Forensic Science Training Centre (RFTC);*
- . *Regional Training Centre, Martinique (CIFAD);*
- . *Regional Drug Training Centre (REDTRAC).*

General or horizontal coordination has also been undertaken at the regional and international levels. The principal organisations included:

- . United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP);
- . European Commission Drug Control Office (ECDCO);
- . UK Department for International Development (DFID);
- . US Caribbean Action Plan Coordinator;
- . OAS/CICAD;
- . CCM Task Force Meetings - Representatives of the entire donor community;
- . CARICOM Secretariat {CCS/Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM)};
- . Inter-Governmental Task Force (IGTF/RCM);
- . US/Caribbean Summit Joint Committee on Justice and Security (SJCJS);
- . High Level Meetings of the European Union/Latin America/Caribbean Co-operation/ Coordination Mechanism on Drugs.

General Observations

A review of the effectiveness of the approach, in coordinating and implementing the regional drug control activities through the above mechanism, revealed several interesting factors.

Firstly, at the national levels, coordination of the various sector activities proved very difficult. The separation of powers within the Ministerial System of Government required direct involvement at the highest political levels to ensure national drug coordination, which in many instances has not been forthcoming.

Secondly, the autonomous professional cultures which developed independent professional pride, and in some cases, insularity among the law enforcement agencies required organisational innovation to ensure an integrated law enforcement approach. The matrix concept of inter-disciplinary Task Force is slowly gaining currency within the Region.

Thirdly, successful implementation of regional projects required full-time executing agencies, which, for the greater part, were either the established International Implementing Agencies like UNDCP and OAS/CICAD or consultants paid from regional or international sources.

Fourthly, the International Community's focus has been on supply reduction and not demand reduction. As a result, there has been significant development in the areas of intelligence gathering, law enforcement training, anti-money laundering activities and maritime co-operation, while relatively less has been achieved in the area of demand reduction which has been the stated focus of the Caribbean.

Fifthly, this lack of balance between supply and demand reduction from the external assistance perspective further widened the gap between demand and supply reduction at the national levels, making national integrated efforts more difficult.

In order to facilitate improvement in the balance between supply reduction and demand reduction activities, a clear Caribbean Drug Coordination Policy needs to be articulated and adopted as soon as possible for effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Transit countries' policies. The profitability of transporting illegal drugs from producer to user creates enormous problems and insecurity for the countries through which the drugs are transported.

In many such countries with limited local resources, as is the case in the Caribbean, the international donor community can significantly influence control policies, potentially skewing local development measures in favour of supply reduction.

Arguably, national organisational structures to coordinate and implement demand reduction are less developed than those set up to coordinate supply reduction.

The outstanding examples of these are the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC) and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). All of these have well supported and established permanent secretariats to coordinate and implement activities, which serve the wider hemispheric and international interests, sometimes at the expense of the Caribbean.

CARICOM Member States have recently embarked on an initiative to establish a Regional Demand Reduction Group of Experts (RDRGE) to better coordinate and implement regional demand reduction programmes.

Criminal Activities. As discussed in Section 2, the range of criminal activity spawned by drugs is a growing problem. These activities not only directly affect governance, in areas such as corruption and money laundering, but also engender societal fear with violent crimes such as murders, shootings and kidnappings - where victims include police officers, witnesses and competitors.

Much of the criminal activity has evolved as separate problems such as illegal firearms and corruption and is sustained by significant profits. Moreover, general crime has benefited from the techniques and methods employed in illegal drug activities. Drug abusers, for the most part, engage in petty crimes to satisfy their addiction.

Drugs Trends. Attached at **Annex IV to this Report** is a statistical overview of drugs trends in the Caribbean provided by the UNDCP. *The Caribbean, referred to in the overview, encompasses a geographical area that is wider than CARICOM.*

In addition to the transit traffic, the Region is a producer and exporter of marijuana, and suffers from the devastating effects of cocaine and marijuana abuse as well as all the violent criminal consequences of internal trade in these drugs.

While marijuana is locally produced, cocaine for local trade is either imported for that purpose or represents a portion of transit shipments left as payment to local facilitators.

Illegal Drugs and Terrorism. Another issue is the relationship between illegal drugs and terrorism. The actual and potential links between these two menaces at the national as well as the international level are well recognized and are also causes for great concern. As mentioned in the Section on Terrorism - **Section 5** - the recommendation is that some of the key regional initiatives against these threats should be operated from a common platform in areas such as –

- (i) Information and intelligence exchange, operational collaboration; and
- (ii) Law enforcement strengthening, to allow a balanced, effective response to the specific activity, as well as to the serious criminal activity arising from the threats. Drug abuse and the attendant consequences are also significant.

3.3 Challenges

The challenges for the Region are to:

- (i) find ways to minimize the transit of illegal shipments, conveyed by marine craft without coming ashore;
- (ii) reduce demand and treat and rehabilitate drug abusers;
- (iii) improve border and port interdiction capability to reduce the drugs' entry;
- (iv) find ways to counter the attraction of crop cultivation and employment in aspects of the illegal drug trade as a means of livelihood;
- (v) introduce a penal system that places greater emphasis on non-custodial sentences, and uniformity of sentences for drug abusers and minor drug offences. The aim is to emphasise treatment and rehabilitation, and to reduce prison overcrowding;
- (vi) find ways to improve law enforcement capacity to equally address drug crimes as well as the myriad serious and complex crimes emerging from activities involving illegal drugs e.g. corruption, money laundering, fraud, kidnapping, illegal firearms trafficking, etc;
- (vii) encourage regional and international co-operation.

3.4 Recommendations

- (i) *Identify the regional priorities and strategies* for drug control and crime prevention.
- (ii) *Develop and strengthen the mechanisms* for implementation and coordination at the national, regional and international levels.
- (iii) *Establish appropriate legislative and administrative mechanisms* to facilitate intra- and inter- regional co-operation.
- (iv) *Strengthen the Regional Coordinating Mechanism* for Drug Control within the CARICOM Secretariat.
- (v) *Pursue judicial system reform* to enable non-custodial penalties, sentencing guidelines, and expeditious trials.
- (vi) *Sign and ratify regional Maritime co-operation agreement* to enable more effective Maritime Interdiction.
- (vii) *Enhance border control and port security systems and measures* to reduce import and export of illegal drugs.
- (viii) *Strengthen Intelligence and Information Exchange capacity.* (To be presented under a separate cover).
- (ix) *Pursue enhanced Law Enforcement capacity* to address illegal drug supply interdiction and investigation.
- (x) *Develop Demand Reduction Programmes* as proposed approved by the Thirteenth Inter-Session at Meeting of Conference of Heads of Government in Belize in February 2002.
- (xi) ***Continue anti money laundering capacity-building initiatives*** as currently delivered through the CFATF and CALP, which now extend to Terrorist Financing.
- (xii) *Pursue a consolidated Pan Caribbean Partnership* to **engage** the wider Caribbean in dialogue and discussion on crafting a way forward in implementing action against Drugs and Crime.
- (xiii) *Take steps to pursue closer collaboration* with USA, UK, Canada, French and Dutch Territories, and Central and South America.
- (xiv) *Pursue more active participation* in UNDCP and CICAD in order to increase opportunities for technical and other support.
- (xv) *Participate more actively* in the process of the OAS/CICAD multilateral evaluation process (MEM) which is now assuming growing significance as a hemispheric axis for technical assistance and capacity enhancement.
- (xvi) *Pursue the creation of Alternative Sustainable Livelihoods* for populations at risk for becoming involved in drug related gainful occupation.

SECTION 4

ILLEGAL FIREARMS

4.1 Introduction

Illegal firearms are considered the single most significant instrument of crime leading to public fear. They are integrally linked to the illegal drug trade, and have evolved as a major independent criminal activity. Instances of the use of firearms in the commission of criminal acts are considered to be on the increase in a growing number of areas such as drug related violence, gang warfare and youth violence, organized crime, insurrection and street crimes against individuals. The firearm is also the standard equipment for terrorists. Rifles have appeared in the commission of crime in a high degree in Jamaica, and to a lesser degree in Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. Except for these cases, the major problem stems from the use of handguns, revolvers and semi-automatic pistols. To some extent, shotguns are in evidence.

While there is evidence of small quantities of 'home-made' firearms in use, the majority of illegal firearms originate from source countries in North America and Europe, where firearms are manufactured for large international and domestic trade.

The UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials, signed by only two CARICOM States to date, is committed to efforts to stem the flow of guns to the Region. Among its provisions, the Convention established *marking* as a key element for facilitating identification and tracing, and has defined what constitutes illicit manufacturing and trafficking. The protocol also requires States that have signed the Agreement, to categorise these defined offences (i.e. illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials) as criminal in their domestic laws. In the current environment where terrorism is increasingly a factor of international relations, measures against illegal firearms assume greater significance.

The Region needs to make every effort to cut off the supply of firearms at source since there are no national or regional boundaries delimiting illegal traffic in these weapons. Therefore, the engagement of source countries in dialogue and co-operation is essential.

Illegal firearms cross borders through official ports of entry and through unofficial entry points along the coastlines of island states. Initiatives to prevent entry must incorporate these issues. Efforts already undertaken will therefore need to be enhanced.

The fact is that there is a large quantity of illegal firearms in circulation in the hands of criminals on the streets of the Region. Moreover, there is the phenomenon of guns available for hire by criminals. This is certainly the case in Trinidad and Tobago.

Some States have experimented with amnesty and “buy backs”, but these appear to have limited effect, and it has not yet been identified whether rewards paid for returning firearms are not used to purchase new firearms.

The need is, therefore, for comprehensive national initiatives aimed at taking guns off the streets. In the case of Small Island States in the Caribbean, assistance with the effective monitoring of coastlines and training programmes to adequately equip law enforcement and customs officials in the interdiction, collection and analysis of illegal weapons is particularly necessary.

4.2 Key Issues

- (i) The effects on society, stemming from the proliferation and use of illicit firearms and ammunition, include –
- (ii) The negative impact on economies;
- (iii) Impact on those regarded as youths at risk;
- (iv) Threat to personal, national and regional security and stability;
- (v) Fear generated amongst the community;
- (vi) The impact of the intimate relationship between organized crime, the illegal drug-trade as well as the illicit trade and use of firearms; and
- (vii) The need for states to adopt and implement UN protocols on the subject.

4.3 Challenges

- (i) Establishing the legal framework to facilitate international co-operation.
- (ii) Strengthening legislation at the national levels to control the inflow of weapons.
- (iii) Enhancing the capacity for more effective law enforcement mechanisms to address the problem of illegal firearms.

4.4 Recommendations

These are categorized into national, regional and international initiatives as follows: -

National level

- (i) All Member States adopt and operationalise by statute, the *UN Protocol on the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms* and the *OAS Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials*.
- (ii) All States consider the implementation of national programmes aimed at taking firearms off the street. The following key elements are suggested: -
 - (a) Dedicated firearms interdiction units.
 - (b) Aggressive intelligence operations aimed at identifying illegal firearms trafficking and firearm hirers.
 - (c) Augment covert intelligence with other initiatives, such as crime-stoppers' programmes.
 - (d) Coastal surveillance by marine law enforcement.
 - (e) Increase intelligence assets in remote coastal areas.
 - (f) Enhance airport and seaport security, targeting firearm imports.

- (g) Review legal and administrative regimes for the issue of firearm licenses to reduce the risk of legal firearms being diverted into criminal use.
- (iii) Access appropriate training and equipment to enhance Customs' capacity to identify and interdict illegal firearms at ports of entry.
- (iv) Encourage use of new Regional Search Training Centre in Jamaica, together with the provision of appropriate equipment at the national levels, to facilitate effective and efficient development of search teams.
- (v) Pursue cooperative arrangements with "source countries" to assist with the training and equipment needs to effectively tackle the inseparable drug and firearms trade, which is seriously impacting on Member States of all sizes.
- (vi) Develop and implement national education programmes by simulating existing Drug Control Demand Reduction Programmes. (Schools to be targeted).

Regional level

- (i) That the ACCP be mandated to -
 - (a) Collate statistics on firearms related offences within the Region;
 - (b) Identify and keep abreast of trends relating to the importation, exportation and concealment methods utilized in the illicit firearms trade, and in so doing, develop and maintain a *modus operandi* database;
- (ii) Include illegal firearms among the target areas for the Regional Intelligence and Information Exchange Project.
- (iii) Negotiate with source countries for stricter monitoring and recording of secondary sales, and domestic sale of ammunition.
- (iv) Ensure integration of existing Regional Intelligence Mechanisms (OCTRIS, ROCISS, RCS, etc.), to facilitate real time exchange of information on firearms related matters.
- (v) Enhance the Region's capacity to monitor the arms and ammunition trade by bona fide manufacturers and dealers. For example, reciprocal arrangements (agreements) with Europe, North and South America regarding the sharing of information on the sale of arms and ammunition to the Region or transiting through the Region could be developed.
- (vi) Develop inter-regional Shiprider-type and other agreements between Member States to facilitate an appropriate marine response.
- (vii) Complete a Regional approach to justice protection, with urgency, to maximize successful investigation and prosecution of firearm offences.
- (viii) Adequate funding for ACCP to allow it to fulfill its mandate.

International level

- (i) Applications for licences to export, import and transit small arms and light weapons should be reviewed in the light of the domestic legislation of the exporting, importing or transit state.

- (ii) Support be given to marking firearms, improved regulation of firearms dealers, strengthening national record-keeping requirements, and the application of more rigorous standards for arms brokers and other traders of small arms and light weapons.
- (iii) The international community is to consider the implementation of measures that would limit the production of arms to levels that meet the need for national defence and security, and would limit civilian access to weapons manufactured for military use.

SECTION 5

TERRORISM - COUNTER-TERRORIST PLAN OF ACTION

5.1 Introduction

The United States-led international response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, has upgraded the threat of terrorism to priority status. While the Region has not historically been part of the arena of international terrorism, there have been instances of 'home grown' insurrectionists, with varying levels of external support, engaging in highly threatening events. An example of this, is Trinidad and Tobago, in 1990.

There are, nevertheless, compelling reasons why the Region needs to fully participate in initiatives against international terrorism.

Firstly, there is the relationship between terrorism and illegal drugs, the latter continuing to be the principal threat to the Region. Terrorism spawns many serious crimes and uses many of the same networks and routes.

Secondly, there is always the possibility that the Region's air and sea transportation networks could be used by terrorist organizations for the conveyance of operatives, instrumentals and materials, including firearms.

Thirdly, the possibility of the exploitation of the Region's sophisticated financial and banking systems in the financing of terrorist activities.

Fourthly, the possibility of the involvement of a regional location – facility, airport, etc. – in the staging of a terrorist incident, which may not directly be targeted against the Region or the State in question.

The Region must take steps to avoid becoming the soft underbelly of the international defensive constraint. However, the negative impact on tourism and other economic activities and the loss of Caribbean lives, combine to compel the Region to join in countering the menace of terrorism.

5.2 Key Issue

The need for the Region to participate fully in the international initiative against terrorism.

5.3 Challenges

The principal challenge is to introduce a regime of defensive counter measures in an environment of scarce and stretched resources. The fact is that terrorist techniques aim at compromising and penetrating protective and control systems, and eluding law enforcement.

Moreover, the relationship between the techniques employed in illegal drugs and terrorism allow for the sharing of a common platform of response in the areas of effective law enforcement, such as, intelligence-sharing, border controls, airport and seaport security, and financial system monitoring and supervision.

5.4 Recommendations

The recommended action is set out in detail in the proposed Plan of Action attached as **Annex V to this Report**. The broad areas for recommended action are as follows -

- (i) Improvement of border control measures and port security in order to limit and monitor the movement and activities of Terrorist elements within the Region;
- (ii) A regime of DOMESTIC security measures aimed at -
 - (a) Improving security at key points and critical infrastructure;
 - (b) More efficient management of intelligence;
 - (c) Public education to keep the public current of the terrorist threat and reducing opportunities for corruption of youth by terrorist elements.
 - (d) Contingency planning for response to terrorist incidents;
- (iii) Legislation to enable implementation of international conventions on terrorism and terrorist financing;
- (iii) Expansion and enhancement of regional intelligence and information-exchange mechanisms for shared use, to include intelligence and information on terrorism.

SECTION 6

THE IMPACT OF DEPORTEES ON CRIME AND SECURITY

6.1 Introduction - Aims, Challenges and Options

In a number of Caribbean countries, criminal deportees are widely viewed as the major force driving the increasing rate of violent crime, introducing new types of crime and generally extending the criminal repertoire of local criminals.

It is believed that they help to extend and intensify the transnational links of ordinary criminals, and are involved in organizing and facilitating the trafficking in illegal drugs and firearms. They are widely viewed as presenting a new and special danger to Caribbean societies. For these reasons, they have attracted much attention and have been of central concern to the Task Force.

The impact of deportees on crime in the countries of the Region is, however, a contested issue. Few studies have been done, regarding the impact of deportees on crime in the Region and the better ones have been very guarded in their conclusions. The ability to properly evaluate this phenomenon is severely constrained by limited data on deportees in most Caribbean countries. While there is considerable data on crimes committed by deportees in the deporting countries in some Caribbean countries there are no records of deportee crimes within their borders.

Despite the difficulties with data, as with any major social problem, the first issue is to properly estimate the size of the deportee problem. Some Caribbean countries have been receiving deported criminals for some time. This became an important issue in the latter half of the 1990s, when the number of deportees rapidly escalated.

The available statistics reveal that between 1995 and 1999, some 11,333 persons were deported to the Caribbean. Of these, the vast majority was deported from the USA, but there were also deportations from Canada, the UK, and other European countries including Netherlands and Norway. There were also some deportations from one Caribbean country to another. Within the Commonwealth Caribbean, the main receiving countries are Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

Between 1995 and 2001, Jamaica received a total of 12,541 deportees.² If the figure reported above (11,333 for the entire Caribbean for 1995-1999) is correct, then Jamaica received close to 100 per cent of all Caribbean deportees. This is hardly likely, and emphasizes the need to critically evaluate the received data. The point, nevertheless, may be made that for many countries, the number of deportees received appears insignificant.

² Tyrone Ferguson, "New Security, the Global Anti-terrorism Campaign: How does the Caribbean Fit?" (np), p. 10.

An understanding of the size of the problem for the main deporting countries is also important since those countries are the region's major trading partners. The deportee problem could damage its image in these countries, which happen to be key markets for the Region's tourism product. The US Immigration and Naturalization Services estimates that in 1996, there were approximately 280,000 illegal Caribbean immigrants in that country, accounting for some 5.6 per cent of all illegal immigrants there. The Caribbean is, thus, not the major source of the problem. In the case of deportations from the USA, Commonwealth Caribbean deportees account for some 5 per cent of all deportations, and if Cuba and the Dominican Republic are added, the figure for the wider Caribbean increases to approximately 15 per cent (a figure that is significantly greater than the estimated percentage of the population of illegal immigrants, i.e. 5.6 per cent). If the estimates by the US Immigration and Naturalization Services are correct, then they have already deported less than 5 per cent of the illegal immigrants to the Region. Future waves of deportees should be expected. At the time of writing, there were no available data on deportations from the UK or the other deporting countries to the Caribbean.

Of course not all deportees are criminals, but the numbers that are criminals have been increasing. It has been reported that some 80 per cent of all deportees to the Caribbean are criminals. This figure is suspect, but has to be provisionally accepted.

Caribbean citizens may be deported for a very wide range of offences. These offences range from murder, rape and other violent offences, including domestic violence and complaints of threatened domestic violence, to drug offences, which range from international trafficking to the possession of small quantities of cannabis, and in a few cases, even minor traffic violations. Typically, however, most criminal deportees are persons charged with violations of the drug laws.

There are considerable difficulties associated with the resettlement of criminal deportees. A significant number may have acquired the life styles of the drug underworld in the developed countries, either as drug dependents or as dealers. These persons may be expected to encounter great difficulties in adjusting to normal conventional lives in occupations and at salaries that are commensurate with their levels of skill. In addition, the already high levels of unemployment in some of the territories, limited opportunities for acquiring new skills, avoiding the stigma of criminal deportation, and starting a new conventional life makes the reintegration of the deportee into society, a difficult prospect.

There are additional difficulties for those deportees who have no support system in their country of origin that would facilitate their settlement. Haiti and St. Kitts and Nevis are notable exceptions to this. In the former country there is a support group "Chans Alternative" which helps to resettle deportees, and in the latter, a State agency that plays a similar role.

In these conditions, it is expected that some deportees would continue their criminal careers in the Caribbean. Jamaica has attempted a risk assessment of its deportees.

The risk factors for criminal involvement include: age at migration (hence socially isolated and without social support), migration status (legal or illegal), number of years away, level of education, skill levels, and so forth.

The study undertaken by the Ministry of National Security and Justice in Jamaica, on Jamaican deportees, found that -

- (i) A majority of the criminal deportees had illegally entered the country from which they were deported. On the other hand, some one third of all of the deportees had legal status in the departing country. Many in this latter group were deported for minor crimes.
- (ii) A majority had been away from Jamaica for more than five years and would have had some readjustment problems. Notably, a significant minority of 14 per cent of the 1,730 persons deported in 2000, had left Jamaica for a period of over 20 years and would have had severe readjustment problems. These are the high-risk persons who may be completely without any social support system.

Apart from risk evaluations, the actual record of criminal re-offending in the Caribbean environment (before leaving and on return) ought to form part of any proper evaluation. In this regard, a basic descriptive study of the Barbadian deportee problem, and preliminary studies in Jamaica, would seem to support the idea that the deportee danger may have been overestimated.

Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago have fairly good systems for recording the criminal activities of deportees. Countries with much larger deportee populations may have greater difficulty, but if knowledge of the problem is to improve, better information systems are required. In some cases, very little is known about deportee crimes in the receiving countries.

Data on deportee crimes in the Caribbean are not readily available. This report is thus forced to largely restrict this aspect of the discussion to the Barbadian and Trinidadian experiences. Between 1995 and 2000, 332 persons were deported to Barbados (89 per cent of these were deported by the USA and Canada). Of these, 17 per cent have been charged with crimes committed in Barbados after their return. The comparable figure for Trinidad and Tobago was 15 per cent (for deportees arriving in Trinidad during the period 1999-2001).

To put these figures in perspective, deportee crime rates are perhaps lower than the crime rate for the local criminal population. The recidivism rate of local criminals exceeds 50 per cent in both countries, as well as in Jamaica. Of course, a better comparison would be between the rate of re-offending by criminal deportees (not all deportees) and the local criminal population. But, even making allowance for this, it is still highly likely that the rate of deportee re-offending is lower than that of the local criminals. There is some variation across the Caribbean, as in the case of Belize, the deportee recidivism rate (approximately 50 per cent) is more closely approximate to that of the local criminal population.

Although imperfect, the existing information suggests that there is nothing particularly dramatic about the quantitative impact of deportee crimes. The qualitative impact of deportee crimes is, however, of great concern. A proper estimation of this is yet to be done. There is little basis for any definitive statement on this that is of Caribbean-wide scope – especially without systematic evaluations of Trinidad, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica, which receive the largest numbers of criminal deportees in the CARICOM Region.

The following are some of the factors accounting for the deportation problem -

- (i) Anti-immigration sentiment among the populations of the deporting countries. This is evident in a number of European countries, including England, France and the Netherlands, and in North America.
- (ii) This anti-immigrant sentiment is very old, but has gained renewed intensity due to real problems with some immigrant sub-populations, and may have further hardened since the terrorist attack of September 11th.

In recent times, a new type of immigrant has emerged that is quite different from the hard-working Caribbean immigrant of the early Post World War II era. Today's immigrants are more diverse, and include criminal elements who enter foreign destinations illegally.
- (iii) The involvement of Caribbean criminals in the drug trade, and their involvement in highly publicized, violent criminal events over the last 15 years, has served to negatively alter the image of the Caribbean immigrant.
- (iv) Criminal offenders from developing countries are easy scapegoats for the crime problems in these countries. This is evident in countries such as England, where Caribbean criminals are seen in a light, similar to how deportees are viewed in the Region, that is, as the driving force behind the drug-trafficking and homicide problems in some of the major cities, and as presenting a special danger to the society. It hardly matters that, for example, in London, where the so-called black-on-black homicide problem is said to be most influenced by Jamaican 'Yardies', the actual rate of black-on-black homicide is lower than the rate of white-on-white homicide.
- (v) Efforts to reduce welfare expenditure on aliens, and to reduce incarceration costs. These concerns are likely to intensify in the present conditions of economic downturn.

As noted earlier, deportations increased after 1996 when the United States, supported by Canada, enacted new legislation designed to facilitate deportations. In the present conditions, the number of deportations is likely to continue to increase. Indeed, the threat of terrorism may serve to further tighten the US and Canadian immigration policy, and could further exacerbate the deportation situation in the Region.

6.2 Key Issues

- (i) Ensuring an objective and definitive evaluation of the potential threat of deportees to the security of the Region, and specifically, their impact on the crime problem.
- (ii) Negotiations with departing States have been largely unsuccessful.
- (iii) Defining the deportee problem as an international, problem rather than simply a problem for the receiving country, thus establishing a basis for collective solutions involving both the departing and receiving countries.
- (i) The central issue here is, on what grounds should the battle against deportations to be fought? It could, for example, involve: limiting the type of person and offence that warrants deportation, defining the terms of the deportation, and codifying the responsibilities of the departing country. In the cases of very violent and dangerous offenders, for example, the receiving countries may wish to insist that they serve out their sentences, limiting possibilities of early parole, so that they arrive in the Caribbean after they have lost their position in any active criminal network and are fairly old.

6.3 Challenges

- (i) The major challenges with respect to the deportee problem are; how to design more effective tracking, monitoring and control of high-risk deportees (and other similarly high-risk criminals) without unnecessarily reducing the rights of the citizen.
- (ii) In continuation of the above, how to improve knowledge levels with regard to deportee crimes in the receiving countries.
- (iii) To invent support systems and provide necessary institutional support to facilitate the re-integration of deportees into Caribbean societies.
- (i) How to make negotiations with the US and other major departing states more effective, and establish a clear basis for international co-operation in the resettlement of deportees, or some categories of deportees.

6.4 Recommendations

The Task Force suggests the following recommendations -

- (i) **The establishment of an Office for the Resettlement of Deportees, modeled on St. Kitts and Nevis (and informed by the experience of Haiti).** An Office for the Resettlement of deportees would not only assist deportees who are unable to find a place for settlement, but, in regard to national security interests, could provide the legal means to keep track of these persons, effective on their arrival in the receiving CARICOM country. More significantly, this recommendation would not be challenged on the grounds of its constitutionality.
- (ii) Such an establishment could also serve to benefit the deportee in three ways, at the level of human security -
 - (a) It may be able to determine the work record of the deportee, with a view to helping him or her gain (at least) short-term employment, thereby making (some of) them less susceptible to stressors within the society that may induce criminal activity;
 - (b) The Office may also be extended to the creation of (a) half way house(s) to temporarily accommodate all deportees who do not have any immediate family or other positive support groups. Such a facility may also be assisted by civil society groups to complement the efforts of the State in assisting the deportee.
 - (c) The Government may also institute proper programs to deal/treat with deportees, depending on the offence(s) committed. For instance, rehabilitation programmes should include drug rehabilitation, with a counseling component to assist them psychologically in dealing with aspects such as culture shock that may hinder their absorption into Caribbean society.
- (iii) Strengthening the regional exchange of information on deportees through the RIU, while passing the necessary domestic legislation that allows for the monitoring of deportees and is consistent with the existing constitutional rights of all citizens.
- (iv) A more in-depth and ongoing study of deportees by consultants or Member States to examine the extent and nature of their impact on crime in the Region.

6.5 Next Steps

- (i) A more in-depth and ongoing study of deportees, by consultants or Member States.

- (ii) The Establishment of a Caribbean Regional Office in Washington D.C, USA.
- (iii) The establishment of Offices for the Resettlement of Deportees as modelled on St. Kitts and Nevis.
- (iv) The conducting of a review of the negotiating stance of the countries of the Region and elaboration of a new approach for dealing with deporting countries.

SECTION 7

CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES

7.1 Introduction - Aims, Challenges and Options

As indicated earlier, the structure of the crime problem varies considerably across the Caribbean. For example, Jamaica is troubled by violence, while Grenada has a very high rate of property crime. Most countries are, however, worried about the emerging violence, drug dealing, and formation of transnational trafficking networks, gangs and juvenile crime. All countries are concerned with crimes against tourists. The existence of these common problems and concerns provides a basis for consideration of general strategies and strategic collaboration within the Region. In this section, some crime reduction strategies are broadly outlined – with emphasis on matters that may be pursued at the regional and sub-regional levels.

Broadly, crime control and prevention strategies may be designed to –

- (i) systematically treat the root causes of crime;
- (ii) make populations more resilient to criminality;
- (iii) strengthen the ability of the responsible institutions to respond to crime in its various expressions.

The Task Force has noted and supports the various anti-crime initiatives, which have recently been launched by several Member States. Several of these are noted within the recommendations contained in this Report. A synopsis of these countries' initiatives is contained in **Box 6**.

Box 6

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

- Re-establish the Civilian Conservation Corp.
- Increase the number of police vehicles.
- Implement COMPSTAT.
- Improve police training in the areas of domestic violence and child abuse.
- Implement the Artisan Youth Programme.
- Develop community clubs, teaming the protective services with young people.
- Introduce joint police/military operations.
- Develop a deportee preparation plan
- Implement an aggressive order maintenance plan for minor offences
- Establish an improved prison reform and Rehabilitation programme.

GUYANA'S ADDITIONAL ANTI-CRIME INITIATIVES

- Purchase state-of-the-art weapons, protective equipment and gear, vehicles and communication sets;
- Reform and strengthen police intelligence;
- Implement special anti-crime training for police;
- Establish a special "crime crack force";
- Review crime legislation;
- Train and provide equipment for community policing groups;
- Speed up the issuing of gun licences, especially to entrepreneurs; and
- Enhance welfare package for police ranks.

BARBADOS

- Introduce police supported neighbourhood watches.
- Introduce Demand Reduction Programmes.
- Develop penal and parole reform policies.
- Increase staff for protective services.
- Standardise sentencing.

JAMAICA

- Increase manpower of the constabulary force.
- Improve collaboration between the Constabulary and private security.
- Increase joint police/military patrols.
- Introduce new legislation on firearms licences and use.
- Launch Peace Management Initiative, in conjunction with NGO's

In the language of the public health officials, the first strategy will represent primary prevention. Programmes designed to reintegrate marginalised, high crime communities, and create legitimate opportunities for high-risk populations are examples of this. This will be a long-term project and will not necessarily be adequate to deal with the problem. Crime is often about how people and whole societies respond to a set of objective conditions that are often described as root causes of crime. Some individuals and groups may be more resilient to such criminogenic conditions than others. Perhaps they have cultural assets that others do not.

Thus, a second line of strategic interventions may seek to reinforce this resilience by pulling on those cultural assets. Such programmes may include very simple things such as systematic efforts to improve parenting skills. These may be considered as secondary prevention strategies, but would also be inadequate.

A third strategic line may entail improving the effectiveness of the institutions responsible for responding to crime. A comprehensive approach ought to involve the integration of all three. While at the national level there is scope for responses that would integrate all three aspects, at the regional level, the third has the greatest scope.

Alternatively, response strategies may be structured in terms of treating root causes and motivations for crime, reducing opportunities for crime, and restricting access to the means and nullifying the facilitators. This would be consistent with the schema introduced in **Section 2**. There is considerable overlap between the two, but they provide a good way of ensuring comprehensive treatment.

If a multifaceted strategy is an appropriate response, especially where the problem is complicated and seemingly intractable, then the issue is raised of how to establish priorities, or, whether the idea of establishing unitary priorities is an appropriate one. An alternate approach is parallelism, where a number of objectives and programmes are simultaneously pursued in a coordinated way. This tends to produce the best results, but presents great administrative and political challenges.

7.2 **Key Issues**

- (i) Defining the crime control problem as a developmental issue that should be integrated with broad developmental policy.
- (ii) Institutional strengthening and extending regional collaboration in this sphere.
- (iii) Creating new regional institutions.

- (iv) Prioritisation, or parallelism.

7.3 Challenges

- (i) Devising coherent strategies for a comprehensive response to the crime problem at the national levels.
- (ii) Building consensus on crime control issues, and strengthening the links between Parliaments, citizens and police services.
- (iii) Seeking to better integrate, where applicable, the marginalised sub-populations that live in highly criminogenic conditions.
- (iv) Developing new legislation to facilitate crime control strategies, without unnecessarily doing violence to the basic rights of citizens.
- (v) Emphasising clusters of simultaneous activities within programmes, prioritising by clusters of activities rather than issues. Resolving the planning and administrative difficulties associated with “parallelism.”
- (vi) Improving planning and institutional responsiveness, based on data; more effective use of available data, and improving data recoding and analysis systems.
- (vii) Resolving the problems of inter-agency coordination that are required for effective holistic treatment of the crime problem.
- (viii) Modernising the Criminal Justice Systems of the Region, including juvenile justice.

7.4 Recommendations

As indicated earlier, the differences in the nature of the crime problem across the Region make it difficult, indeed imprudent, to try to elaborate recommendations that are applicable at the national levels. Further, the work of the CTF was not sufficiently detailed and studied at the national level to allow for this. The recommendations, therefore, focus on possibilities at the regional level. The recommendations that apply at the national levels are, as should be expected, restricted to measures that are sufficiently general, hence relevant to most countries.

These initiatives include - improving crime control planning and systems of accountability, institutional strengthening, and police/criminal justice modernization. As the drug problem is a major driver of the crime rate, efforts to control it must occupy a central place in any crime control strategy.

Restricting the means to commit violence is another fundamental issue. In order to highlight the importance and centrality of these issues, they are discussed in separate sections of this Report. The recommendations presented in this section are limited to the main concerns of the members of the CTF.

7.4.1 Planning and Participation

- (i) Develop National Crime Control Master Plans that would integrate law enforcement, social crime prevention, legal issues and regional and international co-operation. These Master Plans may be modelled on the Master Plans of the National Drug Council.
- (ii) Establish National Crime Commissions with appropriate secretariats to drive implementation of the Crime Control Master Plans. A multi-sectoral commission is considered a key element towards the realization of an all-embracing drive to addressing crime. It will combine the contributions of the public and the police in developing policies and programmes, which represent a balanced approach to crime prevention and law enforcement. These can also be strong platforms for the mobilisation of popular support for anti-crime policies. They may assist in national consensus-building around key policy initiatives. Such models are currently exemplified in St Kitts and Nevis, and are becoming even more deeply rooted in Saint Lucia;

7.4.2 Institutional strengthening

This involves modernizing the Criminal Justice Systems. The CTF was primarily concerned with police and prison reform.

7.4.2.1 Modernizing the Police Services

The primary justification for police reform is to improve public safety within the democratic tradition. Despite the differences in crime patterns across the Region, and the difficulties confronting the various police services, there are some common challenges.

Modernization is an ongoing process that entails: the application of new technologies to policing in the Region, especially information technology and forensic sciences; more advanced training and higher educational requirements for police officers and investigators; and the application of more modern management tools, with greater attention to planning and using results-oriented instruments to ensure accountability. It also means modernizing the relations between police and citizens.

7.4.2.2 Emphasising the Use of Technology

Caribbean police services are likely to encounter more computer aided and technologically sophisticated crimes, and more complex criminal networks and patterns of criminal offences. In order to effectively respond to these developments, their efforts will have to be better aided by the available technology.

- (i) Improvement in technology to deal with passport fraud essentially, in view of the increased use of the Caribbean as a drug transshipment point, and the threat from terrorism.
- (ii) The sourcing of necessary equipment for the building and/or strengthening of regional databases be given priority.
- (iii) Improvement in the local databases of Member States where they already exist using a format that allows easy management.
- (iv) Establishment of NJHQs with databases in 12 Member States.
- (v) Need for a Database to improve information and intelligence sharing capabilities.

7.4.2.3 Improving Training

Associated with the application of more advanced technologies and complex methods of criminal investigation is the need for advanced training and higher educational requirements for police officers and investigators.

Towards this end, the following suggestions:

- (i) That a Regional Training Coordinating Group (RTCG) be established to look at training needs, and examine the capacity of institutions/territories, and simultaneously, that proposals for expanding and carrying forward the Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training programme be pursued.
- (ii) This has already been done, maximizing the use of the new Regional (firearm) Search Training Centre in Jamaica, together with the provision of appropriate equipment at the national levels, to facilitate effective and efficient development of firearm search teams.
- (iii) Application of effective management tools, strengthening accountability
- (iv) Modernisation also includes the application of more modern management tools, greater attention to planning, target setting, and using results-oriented instruments for improved accountability.
- (v) All countries in the Region work together to set common standards for policing in the Region via the creation of a regional inspectorate.
- (vi) This Inspectorate would not only set standards, but would also monitor their implementation. It envisages a pool of regional experts not attached to services they evaluate, precluding bias in the evaluation. **See Annex VI.**
- (vii) Establish Parliamentary Oversight Committees to oversee law enforcement.

7.4.2.4 Modernizing Police-Citizen Relations

In some countries, a basic obstacle to improved police effectiveness is poor police-citizen relations. This problem may be resolved by improved police responsiveness and accountability. Community-Based Policing is a good way to resolve such problems.

At the core of community policing are the principles of responsibility and citizen participation in their own security, partnership with police and other stakeholders, problem-solving, and direct police accountability to the citizenry. The Task Force strongly supports the implementation of the model of Community Based Policing being advocated by the ACCP, which was launched in May 2001.

7.4.2.5 Reform of the Correctional Services

Like the police services, the correctional services, including juvenile corrections, are in need of modernization. The CTF suggests that: -

States initiate steps towards appropriate policies for reform and modernization of prisons in order to reduce the rate of recidivism.

States examine alternatives to imprisonment.

The CTF considered a proposal from the Government of Antigua and Barbuda that a special sub-regional maximum-security prison be built to house dangerous criminals. This will be discussed in a later section.

7.4.2.6 Policy and Research Support

At both national and regional levels, there is need for improved research and policy support for crime control efforts. A systematic evaluation of existing efforts ought to be undertaken, to extract key lessons and stimulate innovation and greater effectiveness. Toward this end, the CTF proposes that:

- A network of experts be established, with the UWI as the focal point, or, that a virtual Regional Crime Research and Policy Unit be created.

SECTION 8

STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

8.1 *Introduction*

This Section considers some of the new institutional and legal mechanisms that were proposed to deal with the reduction of crime, and the related issues of illicit drugs, arms and terrorism. The preceding **Sections 5-7** examined the roles of traditional law enforcement agencies and protective services. In this Section, special attention is given to the proposal from Antigua and Barbuda for the establishment of three Regional institutions - An authority for Crime Prevention and Counter Drug Strategies, a Rapid Response Unit; and High Security Prison(s).

In discussing the legal framework, attention is given to the status of Member States in respect of their compliance with relevant international treaties, and the enactment of legislation designed to increase national and regional security. Emphasis is placed on identifying some of the outstanding areas related to the administration of justice and training of legal practitioners in anti-crime skills.

8.2 *Regional Authority For Crime Prevention and Counter Drug Strategies*

The proposal to establish a Regional Authority for Crime Prevention was intended to ensure that there would be a mechanism responsible for ensuring a more effective formulation and implementation of the anti-narcotics strategy. To this end, it makes provision for a Caribbean Drug Control and Crime Prevention Commission (CDCCP) – reporting to a Council of Ministers. It also suggested terms of reference to delimit the scope of work of the CDCCP as outlined in Box 7.

Box: 7

Proposed terms of reference for the Commission

- (i) Devise and approve a regional anti-narcotics and crime prevention strategy.
- (ii) Manage the policy process, including supervision of the drug enforcement units.
- (iii) Facilitate the drafting of common anti-narcotics legislation.
- (iv) Negotiate co-operation treaties with other countries.
- (v) Coordinate the development and implementation of an education programme against drugs.
- (vi) Mount a diplomatic demarche on behalf of all Caribbean States.

The Task Force agreed with the concept of a regional entity to coordinate strategies and programmes for regional action against crime and security threats. The Task Force considered that such entity would be essential for carrying forward the work initiated by the Task Force itself, an essential element for strategy and policy development, and in the implementation of programmes to address security and crime issues. The Task

Force was of the view that the proposed Commission, comprising a core group of national representatives, would co-opt experts to deal with specific issues.

Consequently, the membership of the CDCPP could be broadened to include the participation of non-CARICOM Caribbean jurisdictions, specifically the non-sovereign territories associated with the U.K., France and the Netherlands. This Commission would require substantial secretariat support. Recommendations proposed for providing this support included the following options –

- (i) **Option A:** Establish a permanent Secretariat from the temporary Secretariat in Trinidad and Tobago, which was created to support the Task Force.
- (ii) **Option B:** Establish a Secretariat patterned on that which was envisaged to support the Pan-Caribbean Initiative of the HIV/AIDS Programme. This formulation assumes donor contribution over a period of years.
- (iii) **Option C:** Strengthen the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the CARICOM Secretariat.

The Terms of Reference (TOR), Organisation and Operational Budgets would be presented for each option. The CDCCP Commission would focus on “strategic” and “administrative” issues, and therefore responsibility for the “supervision of drug enforcement units” in the original terms of reference, would more appropriately fall under the purview of the proposed Regional Rapid Response Unit discussed below.

8.3 Regional Rapid Response Unit

The proposal for a Regional Rapid Response Unit is, in many ways, allied to the sharing of information and surveillance to combat crime at the regional level.

The Task Force agreed that, while the concept and objectives were worthwhile, the implementation of such a Unit would be unworkable, unless there was the political will and the capacity in the Region to -

- (i) **take** full financial responsibility for the maintenance of the unit;
- (ii) **overcome** the logistical considerations in order to attain an effective operation of a dedicated unit, having regard to the expansive and intricate nature of the Region, to which reference has already been made.

The Task Force, therefore, recommended that instead of establishing a new structure in the form of a Unit, it would be more expedient in the first instance, to form a Regional Rapid Response Mechanism with the objectives outlined in **Box. 8.**

► **Box 8**

Objectives of the Regional Rapid Response Mechanism (Proposed by the Task Force)

- (i) Facilitate quick specialist response to incidents of drug related and serious crimes within CARICOM member countries.
- (ii) Establish and maintain a database of officers with specialised skills, knowledge, abilities and experience in investigating drug- related and serious crimes within member countries.
- (iii) Co-ordinate the process of fulfilling requests from members, for the attachment of officers with specialized skills and expertise to deal with specific drug related and serious crimes.
- (iv) Maintain a record of the activities relating to the sharing of expertise and experience among member countries.

It is expected that this mechanism would require a Memorandum of Understanding between participating countries as a guide to its operational procedures and a commitment to comply with the procedures on the part of the signatories. A copy of the proposed MOU and a design of the Mechanism are provided at **Annexes VII and VIII, respectively, to this Report.**

8.4 High Security Prison(s)

The proposal for a regional high security prison was first suggested as an OECS project, which could be widened to include Barbados, the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla. However, at the Fourth Joint Meeting of the Inter-Governmental Task Force of Drugs and Ministers with responsibility for National Security (13 June 2001), the idea was further expanded as a useful project for CARICOM as a whole. Such a facility, it was suggested, could fall under the direction of the proposed CDCCP. The case for such a facility is contained in the remarks made by Prime Minister Bird to the IGTF -

“Our overcrowded prisons are now recruiting and training grounds, as low-risk young offenders are exposed to mature criminals. What is more, the drug culture is being kept alive in many prisons through lax security and even complicity. Our young offenders are being deprived of the opportunity for reform. We cannot allow this to continue.”

These views were considered to be serious enough to have been included by Caribbean Heads in their mandate to the Task Force, which required it to, *inter alia*, -

*“Study the range of complex issues with a view to isolating the fundamental causes of the increasing levels of crime, violence and security threats in the region, **taking into account the submission by Antigua and Barbuda** and the current national, sub-regional and regional initiatives to address the problems.”*

The more specific justifications include –

- (i) Isolation of worst offenders, from non-violent, first offenders who have a better chance of being rehabilitated and reformed (i.e. reducing recidivism);
- (ii) Eradication of the drug culture that is being kept alive in many prisons on account of lax security and complicity;

- (iii) Reduction of the growing demand for space in the prisons of participating Member States.

8.4.1 Key Issues

- (i) The cost of construction, management and maintenance of a high security prison.
- (ii) The overall risks in locating a maximum-security facility in a small island state.
- (iii) Sustainability of a joint facility, based on contributions from participating States.
- (iv) Will these prisons house prisoners on remand *and* those already sentenced by the court?
- (v) Determining whether the problem of overcrowding is a regional or national problem.
- (vi) Is CARICOM, as a Region, with no regional governmental authority, best suited for the management and direction of this initiative?
- (vii) What other complementary reforms are required to ensure that the high security prison functions with maximum efficiency

8.4.2 Challenges

- (iv) While the benefits of high security prisons are understood, a number of challenges remain unresolved. These include -
- (v) The cost of transferring and keeping inmates overseas is likely to be very high and the security implications are unpredictable and may likely add to the already high cost.
- (vi) The procedure to transfer inmates could be quite intricate since it would involve jurisdictional considerations.
- (vii) The possibility that the security of the island on which the facility is located could be compromised.
- (viii) The human rights implications are inestimable. Family visits to inmates might likely be limited, as it would cost the Governments a substantial amount of funds to finance such visits. This in turn would provide a significant challenge to the rehabilitation and re-socialisation process of inmates after their period of incarceration. The issue of cost would also apply to legal visits, especially where there are unresolved court matters.

8.4.3 Recommendations

The Task Force was of the view that the feasibility of the proposal from Antigua and Barbuda could be determined only on the basis of an in-depth expert study that would examine some of the outstanding questions.

The proposal of a high security prison to serve a number of jurisdictions, its benefits, notwithstanding, leaves a number of issues unresolved.

This proposal is currently not feasible at this time for the reasons given above.

8.5 Legal Framework

8.5.1 Overview

In the area of legislative reform, there is substantial compliance among Member States in several areas, but there is need to address the following issues -

- (i) Rule of Law issues, for example, law revision and delays in the Administration of Justice;
- (ii) Training;
- (iii) Implementation of legislation; and
- (iv) Regional and International Co-operation.
- (v) The status of adherence to some of the relevant Treaties by Member States of the Community: Some Member States have enacted anti-terrorism legislation and others are in the process of drafting such legislation.

8.5.2 Key Issues

Questions that need to be answered in seeking to determine the response of the Region to escalating domestic crime and to transnational organised crime:

- (i) What is the response of the Region to international terrorism?
- (ii) Are Member States party to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties at regional and international levels?
- (iii) Is the regional maritime agreement finalised? What are the legal implications thereof?
- (iv) What is the status of the Regional Justice Protection Programme?
- (v) Is it feasible to establish a CARICOM Legislative Drafting Facility?
- (vi) Are the issues of delays in the Administration of Justice being addressed?
- (viii) Is there appropriate training of officials in the Region?
- (ix) What is the response of the Region to the corruption of officials?

8.5.3 Challenges

- (i) Addressing the escalation in domestic crime through substantial strengthening of the legal framework, given the human and financial constraints.
- (ii) Fulfilling the commitment of the Region to take all necessary measures to combat terrorist activities, given the constitutional, human and financial constraints.
- (iii) Participating in international meetings to address collaboration in drafting and implementing legislation to support UN Resolution 1373 and other relevant resolutions to address the issue of international terrorism.
- (iv) Finalising the Regional Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.
- (v) Finalising the Regional Maritime Agreement.
- (vi) Establishing the Regional Justice Protection Programme.

- (vii) Addressing delays in the Administration of Justice.
- (viii) Ensuring adequate training of Government officials.
- (ix) Implementing relevant legislation.

8.5.4 Recommendations

In order to address the above challenges, the Task Force encourages Member States to consider the following -

Delays in the Administration of Justice

- (i) Further training of court officials;
- (ii) Sharing of information on best practices in the Region;
- (iii) Use of drug courts and night courts to expedite hearing of drug matters;
- (iv) Amending the criteria for bail;
- (v) Expanding the scope of existing regional Administration of Justice programmes to all countries; and
- (vi) Uniform application of penalties (sentencing guidelines).

Training

- (i) Taking advantage of opportunities in anti-money laundering training, provided by CALP, CFATF and bilateral programmes; and
- (ii) Training of public officials and the private sector in the implementation of Conventions.

Implementation of Legislation

- (i) Mobilising resources to create institutional capacity for the implementation of legislation;
- (ii) Sourcing technical assistance;
- (iii) Ensuring constitutional validity of legislation in respect of freezing and confiscation of assets;
- (iv) Considering legislation to permit the admissibility of criminal records from other jurisdictions;
- (v) Drafting legislation on precursors; and
- (vi) Enacting laws and mechanisms for sentencing alternatives.

Regional and International Co-operation

- (i) Becoming parties to, and implementing relevant international instruments;
- (ii) Focusing on multi-agency collaboration and capacity-building in the area of asset forfeiture;
- (iii) Signing and ratifying the Regional Maritime Co-operation Agreement;
- (iv) Meeting minimum international requirements regarding anti-money laundering co-operation;
- (v) Operationalising the Regional Justice Protection Programme and focusing on deepening co-operation with major stakeholders, particularly at the international level; and
- (vi) Considering the transfer of proceedings for criminal prosecution of offences in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interest of proper administration of justice;
- (vii) Adopting, urgently, the Regional Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
- (viii) Considering the implementation of a Regional Prison Transfer Agreement;
- (ix) Establishing an intra-regional extradition regime;
- (x) Considering becoming parties to the OAS Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty;
- (xi) Drafting appropriate protocols to improve risk-profiling and detention of suspicious persons at sea ports and airports within the Region;
- (xii) Initiating discussions with firearm manufacturing and exporting countries, with a view to developing an MOU in respect to the exportation of illegal firearms;
- (xiii) Ratifying the Inter-American Firearms Convention and the UN Protocol on Firearms;
- (xiv) Reviewing legislation and regulations in the issuance of firearms; and
- (xv) Signing and ratifying the OAS Convention Against Terrorism.

The CARICOM Secretariat has prepared and presented a project proposal for the establishment of a CARICOM Drafting Facility to USAID, which is currently considering the proposal. The proposal is as follows –

Objective

The main objective of this project is to secure financial and technical assistance to establish and maintain a core of draftspersons in a Regional Facility, to assist CARICOM Member States in meeting the requirements under the Revised Treaty, as well as international obligations.

The drafting requirements of Member States will involve both treaty and legislative drafting to complete the international legal infrastructure of the CSME, and to fulfil commitments under relevant international conventions in the areas of Justice and Security.

Administrative Arrangements

The project will be executed over a period of three years (36 months). The project's administration and execution will be the general responsibility of the CARICOM and OECS Secretariats.

The Facility will comprise the Sub-Committee of the LAC, comprising consisting Attorneys-General, the Drafting Committee of the LAC (consisting of Chief Parliamentary Counsels) and the CARICOM/OECS Secretariat components of the Drafting Group.

Plan of Work

The Work Programme of the Facility will be determined by inputs from Conference, the LAC, other competent organs and the CARICOM/OECS Secretariats. The Work Programme will have to be developed in close collaboration with the CARICOM and OECS Secretariats and approved by the LAC.

Some of the recommended areas of focus for the Drafting Committee are as follows:

- (i) Legislation to implement the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN Drug Control Treaties.
- (ii) Legislation to regulate and monitor telecommunications interception, electronic surveillance and controlled delivery (to ensure evidentiary value).
- (iii) Legislation to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing or trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related material.
- (iv) Legislation against corruption.
- (v) Anti-money laundering legislation pertaining to all serious crimes (most current legislation is restricted to drug crimes).
- (vi) Legislation to implement the benchmarks established in the 40 FATF recommendations, the 19 CFATF recommendations and the 25 point FATF/Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories (NCCT) criteria.

- (vii) Extending the anti-money laundering legislation to comply with Security Council Resolution 1373 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
- (viii) Legislation to implement the Regional Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).
- (ix) Drafting of bilateral extradition treaties and asset sharing agreements.
- (x) Legislation to harmonise sentencing guidelines.
- (xi) Legislation to permit videotaped depositions and other evidence obtained by electronic means, and facilitate admissibility of criminal records from other jurisdictions.
- (xii) Legislation to implement Regional Maritime-Co-operation Agreements.
- (xiii) Needs-assessment and sensitising exercises to facilitate drafting and implementation of legislation re Regional Justice Protection Programme.
- (xiv) Draft legislation to allow for admission of evidence of witnesses unable to appear because they have been intimidated or eliminated.
- (xv) Legislation re transfer of prisoners at the regional level.
- (xvi) Legislation re upgrading capacity in probation services, and developing real alternatives to incarceration in appropriate cases.
- (xvii) Memoranda of Understanding at the highest levels to facilitate the dissemination of information and intelligence.
- (xviii) Drafting of legislation to implement the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocols.

SECTION 9

CAPACITY-BUILDING

9.1 Introduction


The Task Force considers capacity-building within the regional infrastructure and the development of human resources to be essential elements for cost-effective and specific strategies in addressing the problems of the Region. It is essential that the Region assumes ownership of these counter initiatives to crime.

The recommendations in each section are informed by a recognition of the importance of capacity-building. This section outlines proposals for Maritime Cooperation and Regional Law Enforcement Training.

9.2 Maritime Cooperation (Regional Maritime Counter Drug Strategy)

9.2.1 Introduction

Under the supervision of the PMO, National Joint Headquarters (NJHQs) have been established in all Community Member States to coordinate the activities of National Law Enforcement Agencies. In order to effectively interdict illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs through the Caribbean Sea, it is now proposed that Sub-regional Joint Headquarters be established to coordinate the activities of the maritime assets of the wider Caribbean. This is to be achieved through sub-regional zones based on geo-political considerations. The organogram below provides a Schematic Framework for Regional Maritime Cooperation proposed by the Task Force.



Sub-regional Joint Headquarters are already established and in operation in the Southwest (Curacao), Northern Caribbean (JIATF(E) in Key West), and OPBAT in The Bahamas.

The model envisages the operationalisation of an additional 5 zones to the three already in existence, to comprise a Regional Maritime Co-operation Authority.

9.2.2 Key Issues

- (i) Establishment of National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ);
- (ii) Establishment of Sub-Regional Headquarters; and
- (iii) Regional Maritime Co-operation post PMO, that is, from Jan 2002.

9.2.3 Challenges

- (i) Collaboration with Non-CARICOM States (French Departments, The Netherlands Antilles, USA and British Dependent Territories) which are partners in regional co-operation;
- (ii) Enhancing national co-operation among Law Enforcement Agencies; and
- (iii) Establishing the requisite institutional framework and Standing Operating
- (iv) Procedures (SOPs) in the NJHQs.

9.2.4 Recommendations

- (i) There be a meeting of Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Officials from the US, UK overseas Territories, The Netherlands Antilles, Overseas French Departments, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and CARICOM, to review the feasibility of the proposed structure and agree on the organisation and mechanisms for operationalising the maritime co-operation framework for the wider Caribbean, paying particular attention to the following -
 - a) Coordination of maritime activities in the Southern Caribbean by Trinidad and Tobago;
 - b) Coordination of maritime activities for the entire Eastern Caribbean by (RSS)-Barbados in collaboration with the Maritime Coordination Centre in Martinique. (This recommendation was endorsed by the High Level Meeting);
- (ii) The establishment of National Law Enforcement Committees (NADLEC), comprising Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies, to coordinate all joint law enforcement activities;
- (iii) The early conclusion of negotiations of the Regional Maritime Agreement.

9.3 Law Enforcement Training

9.3.1 Introduction

The phenomenon of increasing crime and violence in the CARICOM Region has given rise to fear, uncertainty and anxiety and has consequently affected the economic stability and social fabric of Member States.

The situation highlighted an urgent need for effective and coordinated law enforcement activities, not only by the police, but other law enforcement agencies viz., Customs, Coastguard, the Defence Force, Immigration and other security forces.

9.3.2 Challenges

Some challenges facing regional police forces include:

- (i) The traditional model of policing, characterized by incident-driven and reactive policing, is an inappropriate and ineffective response here;
- (ii) National fiscal policies, that by necessity is finite in nature and has to address competing priorities;
- (iii) Few COPs have control of budgets; and
- (iv) Few National Training Strategies & Plans.

A search for a regional law enforcement training philosophy that will support and equip police organisations and their officers to address the issues, and meet these challenges, will need to be comprehensive, contemporary and innovative. Account will need be taken of national fiscal policies on security matters.

These challenges call for responses that require fundamental changes in the delivery of LE services, which will require fundamental changes in the delivery and conduct of law enforcement training. The changes in skills, knowledge and behaviour that law enforcement officers will require can be effected only by relevant and effective training to strengthen the development of human resources in the security forces, and other agencies Caribbean-wide.

Necessary changes to the delivery of police services would require, in the first place, a reform of policing to a model service delivery that is collaborative, responsive, inclusive and client-centred.

This service delivery model would be a partnership between the police and the community, and its goal would be to achieve safe homes and communities, and ultimately contribute to an improved quality of life within the Caribbean region.

For this paradigm shift to be achieved, training at all levels would be a pre-requisite. In pursuit of this reform process, the Task Force recommends support to the initiative currently being undertaken by ACCP, in collaboration with RCMP and the Government of Canada.

Secondly, there is need for joint and common training involving all law enforcement agencies. This was addressed earlier by the Task Force in its interim report, presented to the Heads at their Thirteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting in Belize in February 2002. It essentially called for support to a Caribbean Regional Law Enforcement Training Coordination Group (RTCG) to promote, coordinate and develop law enforcement management development and training that would be common to more than one agency.

At a Regional Training Strategy Workshop held in Barbados on 19 and 20 February 2002, participants representing 15 countries agreed to a Mission Statement and other elements for the organization, management and functioning of the group. A Caribbean Regional Common Law Enforcement Management Development and Training Strategy for the period 2002-2005 has been developed and recommended for approval. **(See Annex IX to this Report)**

9.3.3 Recommendations

- (i) Support the police reform process through the ACCP Community Policing Programme initiative, in collaboration with RCMP and with support from the Canadian Government in order to achieve effective quality service delivery;
- (ii) Ensure that the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) have established –
 - a) An identified individual, section, or department with specific or general responsibility, for issues relating to training;
 - b) A clear system for identifying and prioritising their law enforcement training needs;
 - c) A simple training plan, identifying their key areas targeted for securing training;
 - d) A policy for identifying and selecting the most appropriate individuals to undergo particular training;
 - e) A mechanism for constantly reviewing and revising their training needs on a regular basis;
- (iii) Working together to combine resources through collaborative co-operation, including: -
 - (a) The political will
 - (b) Political and financial support for the ACCP Secretariat
 - (c) Political and financial support for the RTCG; and
 - (d) Support for the implementation of the several recommendations of
 - (e) The ACCP/DFID Review of Police Training in the Caribbean

SECTION 10

CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

Despite time and resource constraints, it is apparent from the Task Force report that there is much validity to the concerns of the Heads regarding crime. Crime in the Region appears to be on the rise.

Moreover, there is an increase in public fear, largely attributable to growing incivility, drug trafficking, an increase in the use of firearms, and wanton violence in the perpetration of offences against the public. Clearly in such circumstances, good governance is placed under severe stress.

Institutions created in response to crime, to date, have served the Region well. CCLEC, RSS, ACCP and the PMO have been able to work with national, regional, and international organizations towards the goal of maintaining restraint in the society. The new forms and threatening nature of crime are forcing a paradigm shift in the ways in which policing, crime prevention and control are approached.

This situation indicates that the evolving situation has overtaken the capacity of existing arrangements and demands new institutions and creative solutions.

Undoubtedly, the existing institutions still have a vital role to play in curbing incivility. Yet, it would be a mistake not to take note of increases in relative privation, mounting social pressure, the attendant demand on Governments to find solutions to these ills, and the globalisation of crime. These point to the need for an institution that will drive the desired changes demanded by the Conference of Heads of Government.

The proposed regional coordinating entity/authority will serve to bring together the collective capacities of existing institutions, as well as introduce and develop new approaches and infrastructure, as recommended in the establishment of a Regional Rapid Response Mechanism and others in this Draft Report.

It will foster a coordinated approach. This new multifaceted approach to crime and security is the real strength of the proposed mechanism.

Cognisant of the financial constraints within the Region, the Task Force therefore believes that the following approach, based on short-, medium- and long-term strategies, offers the best prospects for achieving the expected outcomes from the mandate of Heads of Government. The approach is as follows –

1. *Short-term:* Support the continuation of the activities of the Caribbean Task Force for a further six- month period, to 31 January 2003 to deal with outstanding issues, specifically the development of a Regional Strategic Framework. The Framework will provide cohesion for proposals for funding various components that are deemed to be urgent priorities. It will draw on the expertise within and outside the Region, allowing the Task Force, during this period, to be more focused and specialized to fill its requirements. The Regional Strategic Framework will require further scrutiny of the Report, and will aim at defining priorities for implementation.
2. *Medium-term/Long-term:* Strengthen the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the Secretariat. This will require marginal increases in the professional staff complement. The RCM will provide effective management and administration of the Regional priorities for crime and security that have been determined by the appropriate Regional authorities made up of Ministers of Security and/or Attorneys-General. As part of the COHSOD system, this will benefit from the synergies that will be derived from overlapping policy concerns of other organs of the Community, in particular the COTED, the COFCOR, and the Legal Committee. The specific programmes identified in the recommendations will be commissioned to various regional agencies such as the UWI, ACCP, CICAD, UNDCP (Caribbean), and other specialists.
3. *Long-term:* Establish a Pan Caribbean Partnership for Crime and Drugs. The structure and function of this entity will be evaluated as part of the terms of reference for developing the Regional Strategic Plan, to be carried out by the Task Force in the period July-December 2002.

The Regional Strategic Framework for Crime and Security should form the basis of a meeting between CARICOM and the donor Community, with a view to determining specific areas of collaboration, and funding for the short- and medium-term priorities in the Framework.

At the High-Level Meeting on Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, held in Trinidad and Tobago, December 2001, the donor community expressed interest in partnership with the Region. At that time, it was agreed that CARICOM would prefer to await the Report of the Task Force. This Report, and the proposed follow-up, affords the Region the possibility of meaningful co-operation with external agencies, based on the considered priorities.